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[I]t is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to 
make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that statutes always have 
some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative 
discovery is the surest guide to their meaning. 
Learned Hand1 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
For over two hundred years the American patent system has fostered 
innovation by providing a limited monopoly on new inventions in 
exchange for full disclosure.2  Recent innovations in areas unimagined 
by previous generations have strained the patent system’s ability to 
accommodate new technologies within the existing legal framework.  
This Comment explores an example of this problem involving software 
and proposes a framework for integration of software into a patent 
system oriented around tangible, physical innovations. 
On August 11, 2003, a small Illinois technology company, Eolas 
Technologies, was awarded the staggering sum of $520.6 million in 
damages against Microsoft.3  This enormous damage award was granted 
by a jury in the federal district court for the Northern District of Illinois4 
for an increasingly litigated area5: patent infringement.6  Eolas successfully 
 1. Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945), aff’d, 326 U.S. 404 
(1945). 
 2. This quid pro quo forms the basis for the patent system; while individual 
patentability requirements—as well as the duration and scope of protection—have varied 
over the years, the basic requirement of disclosure in exchange for protection has 
remained.  See generally FRED WARSHOFSKY, THE PATENT WARS (1994) (discussing 
historical changes in the scope of patent protection). 
 3. Joseph Menn, Microsoft Loses UC Patent Case, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2003, at 
C1.  Despite the size of this award, things could have turned out worse for Microsoft had 
the jury granted the plaintiff’s request for damages of $1.2 billion.  John Markoff, Jury 
Rules Against Microsoft in Patent Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2003, at C2. 
 4. Patent protection is an exclusive federal right and Congress limits jurisdiction 
over patent law issues to the federal district courts, providing that “[t]he district courts 
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action . . . relating to patents . . . .”  28 U.S.C. 
§ 1338(a) (2000).  In addition, appeals from the federal district courts in patent cases are 
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit rather than the federal circuit courts.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2000). 
 5. According to one source, the number of patent lawsuits rose by thirty percent 
from 1997 to 2002.  Michelle Kessler, The 521-Million-Dollar Man, USA TODAY, Sept. 
30, 2003, at 3B.  The high-tech boom of the 1990s, which was heavily focused on 
Internet and software technologies, has led to “an onslaught of patent infringement 
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alleged that Microsoft had improperly incorporated its patented 
technology into the Windows operating system and Microsoft’s Internet 
Explorer web browser.7  The result of this ongoing8 David versus 
Goliath9 battle is the second largest patent infringement verdict in 
history10 and the first significant patent victory against Microsoft in 
nearly ten years.11
cases.” Amalia Deligiannis, Browser Dispute Costs Microsoft $521 Million, CORP. 
LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 2003, at 52.  Patent industry consultant James J. Nawrocki, who has 
traced the history of patent litigation for the last twenty years, notes that “[w]e continue 
to see an increasing number of U.S. patent applications and grants, and a corresponding 
trend [increase] in patent litigation . . . .  By gathering and updating this information on a 
regular basis, we hope to make legal professionals more aware of the surging tide of 
patent litigation and its serious financial implications to a company’s bottom line.”  Top 
Five Patent Damage Awards in First Half of 2002 Exceed $100M, DAILY REC. OF 
ROCHESTER, Aug. 8, 2002, LEXIS, News Library, Drecro File. 
 6. Patent infringement generally involves making or using another’s patented 
innovation.  See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000).  Infringement is discussed in detail later in this 
Comment.  See infra notes 84–97 and accompanying text. 
 7. Menn, supra note 3, at C1. 
 8. The case was originally filed by Eolas in 1999.  Deligiannis, supra note 5, at 
52.  Microsoft has already asked for rehearing of some aspects of the case, including a 
charge of inequitable conduct, which involves failure to fully disclose information to the 
patent office during the patent application process (known as prosecution in the patent 
trade).  See Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 99 C 626, 2003 WL 22078029, at 
*1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2003) (detailing claim of breach by inequitable conduct during 
patent prosecution).  Based on Microsoft’s statements of intent to appeal various aspects 
of the case, including the patent’s validity, it is likely the case will end up at the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit which hears all patent appeals.  See supra note 4. 
 9. This case pits technology giant Microsoft against Eolas Technologies, a 
company whose sole employee is its founder and chief executive Michael Doyle.  
Barbara Rose, Inventor Wins Patent Suit Against Microsoft, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 12, 2003, at 
C1, LEXIS, News Library, Chtrib File.  Doyle is, however, joined in this case by the 
University of California, an assignee of the patent.  The University joined Doyle in the 
lawsuit after Microsoft alleged it could not proceed alone because Doyle had been a 
professor at the University in 1994 when he made his patented invention.  Nevertheless, 
Doyle has held exclusive rights to the invention since 1994.  Deligiannis, supra note 5, at 
52; see also Steven M. Cherry, David and Goliath Versus Another David, IEEE 
SPECTRUM, Dec. 2003, at 47 (summarizing the history of the case and suggesting that the 
final award could go as high as $1.2 billion). 
 10. Barbara Rose, Microsoft Friend, Little Guy the Foe; Web Groups Join Giant in 
Fight to Overturn Patent, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 5, 2003, at C1, LEXIS, News Library, Chtrib 
File.  The largest patent damage award in U.S. history was $873,158,971 in a landmark 
1991 case between Polaroid and Eastman Kodak.  Top Five Patent Damage Awards in 
First Half of 2002 Exceed $100M, supra note 5.  Polaroid was awarded these damages 
for Kodak’s infringement of its instant camera technology.  See Polaroid Corp. v. 
Eastman Kodak Co., 867 F.2d 1415, 1416 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (discussing Polaroid’s suit 
against Kodak for infringement of ten patents related to its instant camera and film 
system). 
 11. Microsoft’s most recent loss in a patent case goes back to its highly publicized 




The basic elements of Eolas are straightforward.12  Microsoft developed 
and sold, typically in conjunction with its popular Windows operating 
system, the Internet web browser Internet Explorer.13  Eolas successfully 
claimed that Microsoft incorporated technology covered by its patent14 
into the web browser and then sold and exported the protected software 
without authorization, resulting in several forms of patent infringement 
liability.15
Just two weeks after the Eolas verdict, the same infringement issues 
surfaced again in a second case, also involving Microsoft, under the 
same statutory provisions.16  In this second case, another software 
company, Imagexpo, L.L.C., contended that Microsoft infringed its 
patented NetMeeting software in a similar way.17
Aside from sensationalism due to the prominence of the defendant and 
the amount of damages involved, both of these cases raise a number of 
interesting legal issues18 related to software patents as well as extraterritorial 
1994 case against Stac Electronics in San Diego.  A jury awarded Stac $120 million for 
Microsoft’s infringement of its patented hard disk compression technology.  As a 
consequence, Microsoft had to pull its highly successful NT operating system from the 
market to remove the infringing code.  Maureen O’Gara, Eolas Clips Microsoft for 
$521m, CLIENT SERVER NEWS, Aug. 18, 2003, at 1, LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File. 
 12. The trial jury found that Microsoft had infringed a U.S. patent held by Michael 
Doyle that claims a means for sending software applications over the Internet to a user’s 
computer.  Markoff, supra note 3, at C2. 
 13. A web browser is an application program used to access and display 
information stored on other computers connected to the Internet.  A browser displays 
information formatted in an appropriate language such as hypertext markup language 
(HTML) or other standard file formats such as PDF, JPEG, or DOC.  Web browser 
plugins allow files in specialized formats to be displayed in the browser.  See Webopedia 
Computer Dictionary, Plug-in, at http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/p/plug_in.html 
(last modified May 17, 2004); What’s a Plug-in?, Netscape Brower Central, at 
http://channels.netscape.com/ns/browsers/plugins.jsp (last visited Feb. 9, 2005). 
 14. The patent at issue is described as a “[d]istributed hypermedia method for 
automatically invoking external application providing interaction and display of 
embedded objects within a hypermedia document.”  U.S. Patent No. 5,838,906 (issued 
Nov. 17, 1998). 
 15. Sale of a product that incorporates another’s patented technology, without 
authorization, is perhaps the most blatant and obvious form of patent infringement as 
statutorily defined.  See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).  Patent infringement can, however, 
occur in a number of other ways, including by extraterritorial manufacturing that would 
not otherwise be prohibited.  See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2000). 
 16. Imagexpo, L.L.C. v. Microsoft Corp., 299 F. Supp. 2d 550 (E.D. Va. 2003). 
 17. Imagexpo, 299 F. Supp. 2d at 552 (involving a similar claim that Microsoft 
supplied Golden Masters for overseas manufacture, implicating § 271(f) liability). 
 18. Beyond the specific legal issues in question, at least one commentator suggests 
that Eolas threatens the viability of the Internet itself, classifying it as “[t]he most 
important patent case in the history of the Internet.”  Steven M. Cherry, Eolas vs Web, 
IEEE SPECTRUM, Jan. 2004, at 85.  Eolas’s patent covers methods for invoking other 
software from a web browser.  This includes automatic invocation of programs to display 
text files in forms such as portable document format (PDF), or media players to display 
movies, sounds, or graphics.  Because these applications have become so pervasive, Tim 
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patent infringement.19  Some of these issues are hesitantly addressed by 
both District Courts for the first time.20  In imposing liability in Eolas, 
the Court first looked to Microsoft’s manufacture and sale of the infringing 
software in the United States, a relatively straightforward application of 
direct patent infringement.21  Going beyond domestic product sales, however, 
the Eolas court also allowed imposition of liability for international sales 
where the product was assembled abroad from components of the 
patented invention exported from the United States, including Microsoft’s 
allegedly infringing Windows operating system.22  Liability under these 
extraterritorial provisions, codified in 35 U.S.C. § 271(f), can be imposed 
even though the components themselves do not enjoy any patent 
protection.23  This provision is very recent in patent law development, 
having been in place for only twenty years.24  During this time, software 
Berners-Lee, inventor of the Web and head of the World Wide Web Consortium, wrote 
the patent office requesting a reconsideration of Eolas’s patent to “prevent substantial . . . 
damage to the operation of [the] World Wide Web.” Cherry, supra note 9, at 47 (quoting 
Tim Berners-Lee’s letter to the head of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office).  As a 
consequence of this reconsideration, Microsoft claims that the patent office may “come 
to its rescue” and cancel Eolas’s patent, making the infringement issue moot.  Microsoft 
Says U.S. May Cancel Patent, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2004, at C3. 
 19. Extraterritorial infringement involves activities outside the United States that 
impose liability under a United States patent, which traditionally provides protection 
only within national geographic boundaries.  See 35 U.S.C. § 100(c) (2000) (defining the 
“United States” and “this country” as “the United States of America, its territories and 
possessions”).  Extraterritorial infringement liability has been greatly expanded within 
the last twenty years and liability can now be imposed for exporting components of a 
patented invention or importing a product made abroad from a patented process, even if 
the product itself is not protected by a patent.  See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271(f–g) (2000). 
 20. The District Court in Illinois, in a Memorandum Opinion and Order allowing 
imposition of liability for extraterritorial infringement activities by Microsoft, notes that 
the issue of software component export has not previously been addressed.  Eolas Techs., 
Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 274 F. Supp. 2d 972, 973 (N.D. Ill. 2003).  The District Court in 
Virginia cited one earlier software case involving a process patent that rejected liability 
under § 271(f) for a process patent.  Imagexpo, 299 F. Supp. 2d at 552 (citing Enpat, Inc. 
v. Microsoft Corp., 6 F. Supp. 2d 537, 539 (E.D. Va. 1998)). 
 21. Direct infringement involves, among other activities, making or selling of 
another’s patented invention within the United States while the patent is still active.  See 
35 U.S.C. § 271(a). 
 22. Eolas Techs., Inc., 274 F. Supp. 2d at 974.  The jury was allowed to impose 
liability under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) for export of a “golden master,” a master copy of the 
Windows operating system that is subsequently loaded onto computer hard disks during 
final computer assembly abroad.  Id. at 973. 
 23. Liability is imposed merely for supplying components of a patented invention, 
for overseas assembly, with knowledge that assembly would be an infringement if done 
in the United States.  See 35 U.S.C. § 271(f). 
 24. Patent law has a long history in the United States, being inherited by the 




has only been considered a potential component in one case, where it 
was ultimately rejected.25  By raising the issue again, Eolas and 
Imagexpo suggest that software might now receive serious attention as a 
component for liability purposes under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f).  This raises a 
number of concerns about the unique characteristics of software.  These 
include whether software, due to its intangible nature, should be considered 
a component at all for purposes of extraterritorial infringement.  If so, 
what constitutes a software component for liability purposes, and what 
activities constitute export or supply of these components for liability 
purposes?26  As a consequence of the visibility of these cases, these 
questions are likely to garner much attention.27  Moreover, the rapid 
increase in global product markets, growth in both domestic and overseas 
software development, and the increasing trend towards outsourced 
offshore manufacturing make extraterritorial infringement under these 
provisions much more likely.28  In addition, the growth of the Internet 
and its use as a channel for software distribution and execution will 
undoubtedly raise concern about the boundaries of export channels for 
liability purposes.29
colonies from England.  Moreover, many of the basic concepts, such as novelty and 
territorial limitations, have remained the same.  See generally ROGER E. SCHECHTER & 
JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE LAW OF COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS AND 
TRADEMARKS 284–90 (2003). 
 25. Enpat, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 539. 
 26. The statutory provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) impose liability for supplying a 
“component” or “components,” without clarifying what constitutes a component.  
Liability is imposed when protected components are “supplied” or “cause[d] to be 
supplied.”  See 35 U.S.C. § 271(f). 
 27. For reasons discussed later in this Comment, these two cases may open the 
door for increased litigation over software component exports, depending on how 
software components are ultimately integrated into the extraterritorial infringement 
provisions of § 271(f). 
 28. Software development has been a rapidly growing technology field in the 
United States.  Recently, however, many companies have been outsourcing this work to 
programmers in low cost countries such as India and China.  A survey by the Institute for 
Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) noted that “companies are outsourcing 
everything from product design and tech support to employee benefits—to low wage 
countries like the Philippines, China, Mexico, Costa Rica, India and others.”  The 
survey’s projections for export of computer programming jobs is particularly 
troublesome for the domestic job market, predicting a loss of 277,000 jobs by 2010 and 
473,000 by 2015.  Sharon Richardson, Watching the Tide Wave White Collars Offshore, 
IEEE NEWS & VIEWS, Dec. 2003, at 2.  Any further impediments to domestic software 
development, such as imposing liability for mere export of a software component not 
protected outside the United States, might serve to accelerate this outsourcing, further 
impacting the domestic job market. 
 29. While no cases have yet arisen over Internet-based infringement under 35 
U.S.C. § 271(f), one prominent software patent attorney and author suggests this type of 
Internet scenario as potential grounds for liability.  See GREGORY A. STOBBS, SOFTWARE 
PATENTS 659–60 (2d ed. 2000). 
TIETSWORTH 4/7/2005  1:12 PM 
[VOL. 42:  405, 2005]  Exporting Software Components 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 411 
 
This Comment examines these issues by exploring how software 
components and their export might be harmonized with extraterritorial 
infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f).  As the District Court observed 
in Eolas, fitting software into these newer provisions has been “long 
debated in this case” and is a matter of first impression, noting that 
“[t]here is no clear governing precedent.”30  As is common when the patent 
system attempts to integrate new types of innovations, such as software, 
merger into the existing paradigm becomes conceptually challenging.31
This Comment addresses these issues by first summarizing the basic 
requirements of patentability and how software, which was initially 
viewed as unpatentable (and therefore not subject to direct infringement 
and, by implication, other forms of infringement as well), gradually 
gained acceptance as patentable subject matter.  It then examines patent 
infringement, its historical limitations, and recent expansion to include 
extraterritorial activities such as export of components used in overseas 
 30. Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 274 F. Supp. 2d 972, 973 (N.D. Ill. 
2003). 
 31. Commonly encountered problems include difficulties in basic judicial 
understanding of the new technology, interpretation of existing statutory provisions in 
light of its novel characteristics, and decisions regarding whether existing statutes should 
be interpreted narrowly to exclude the new technology or broadly to include it.  
Examples of the fundamental understanding problem abound in patent cases.  For 
example, in Eolas the District Court made a basic error about the very type of software at 
issue, referring to what should be described as object code, Microsoft Windows itself, as 
“source code.”  Id.  The distinction between source and object code, a fundamental one 
when analyzing software, is discussed in more detail later in this Comment.  See infra 
notes 193–214 and accompanying text.  In addition to the district courts, the Supreme 
Court also struggles with this problem.  In a recent case involving a chemical process, 
the Court dealt with pH, a logarithmic parameter related to ion concentrations in a liquid 
and its associated acidity, and described a pH difference of 1.0 as a difference in acidity 
of a factor of ten.  Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 22 n.1 
(1997).  On remand, the Federal Circuit indirectly reprimanded the Supreme Court for 
misconstruing pH, noting that factor of ten represents a “ten-fold difference in hydrogen 
ion concentration, rather than literally indicating a ten-fold difference in ‘acidity’” as the 
Court had written.  Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 114 F.3d 1161, 
1164 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1997).  The issue of statutory subject matter interpretation has 
occurred frequently as revolutionary, as opposed to evolutionary, technologies are 
developed.  Recent examples include struggles to assimilate biotech inventions such as 
genetically engineered organisms, into the patent system.  See, e.g., Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (overruling the patent office’s assertion that biological 
organisms were not patentable subject matter).  Breadth of statutory interpretation was 
recently raised in a case concerning a statutory provision of 35 U.S.C. § 271(g), which 
protects products manufactured abroad using a domestic process patent.  See Bayer AG 
v. Housey Pharms., Inc., 340 F.3d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (interpreting statute 
narrowly rather than broadly to preclude protection for intangible data outputs from a 
patented process). 




manufacturing.  This is followed by an analysis of software components 
under § 271(f) and a proposal for classifying various types of software 
within the statutory extraterritorial infringement provisions.  Various 
means of exporting software are then discussed and a proposal is made 
for determining whether the export violates the statutory infringement 
provisions.  Finally, several policy concerns are raised suggesting that 
liability for software component export under § 271(f) be limited.  In 
conclusion, it is argued that software should enjoy some protection 
under § 271(f), but that the scope of protection should be narrowly 
construed. 
II.  PATENTABILITY BASICS 
A.  Fundamental Requirements 
To understand the distinction created by § 271(f) between patented 
inventions and their components, it is helpful to review the basics of 
patentability.  In the United States, patents enjoy a high pedigree, being 
expressly authorized by the U.S. Constitution.32  As implemented, this 
grant represents a quid pro quo between monopoly and incentive to 
innovate.33  This balancing is typically done by limiting the duration of 
 32. Article I gives Congress the power to grant inventors a monopoly on their 
work as an incentive for innovation.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  This grant, which 
covers both patents and copyrights, is designed to “promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right 
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”  Id.  The patent grant is unique in Article I 
Congressional powers in that it specifies not only the power granted but also the means 
by which the power is to be implemented.  The power granted by the Constitution is 
discretionary but has been used and statutorily codified almost since adoption of the 
Constitution, with the first patent act appearing in 1790, barely a year after adoption of 
the Constitution itself.  STOBBS, supra note 29, at 13. 
 33. This quid pro quo represents a delicate Congressional balancing act.  If 
Congress chooses to grant a patent monopoly to an inventor, which is generally 
disfavored for economic reasons, it must balance the disadvantages against the economic 
incentive to innovate provided by monopoly protection.  The Supreme Court, in the case 
that motivated the enactment of § 271(f), noted that “monopolies—even those conferred 
by patents—are not viewed with favor.”  Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 
U.S. 518, 525 (1972) (quoting Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., 310 F. Supp. 
926, 929 (E.D. La. 1970)).  In an earlier landmark patent case, Supreme Court Justice 
Clark noted the historical disfavor of monopolies, pointing out that a “monopoly on 
tea . . . sparked the [American] Revolution . . . .”  Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 
7 (1966).  Thomas Jefferson was adamantly opposed to the Constitutional grant of 
monopoly power, writing that “the benefit even of limited monopolies is too doubtful to 
be opposed to that of their general suppression.”  Id. at 8 (quoting 5 THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 47 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1895)).  To balance this disfavor, the 
Constitution explicitly requires the monopoly be for a limited time and only as an 
incentive to promote Science and Useful Arts.  The balance between monopoly protection 
and duration has not frequently come into question in the patent domain, which generally 
limits the monopoly to twenty years or less.  35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000). 
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the patent as well as its geographic boundaries.34  Congress may also 
limit the scope of what is patentable.35  Assessing whether new technologies 
fit within the scope of patent protection has been a recurring problem, 
particularly with the revolutionary technological innovations of the past 
half century.36  As discussed in this Comment, fitting software into 
established patentable subject areas has proven to be conceptually 
difficult.37
B.  Patentable Subject Matter 
Patentable subject matter was codified in the 1952 Patent Act38 based 
 34. The current duration for U.S. patents is twenty years from the date of issuance.  
See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2).  The geographic boundary limitation traditionally provided 
protection only within U.S. territorial boundaries.  Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline 
Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 650 (1915) (nothing that infringement cannot be based on acts 
done wholly in foreign countries).  The recent expansion of this limitation through 
provisions in 35 U.S.C. § 271 has led to problems as discussed in detail in this Comment. 
 35. Under current judicial interpretation of the patent statutes, subject matter 
should be construed broadly because Congress has given it “wide scope.”  Chakrabarty, 
447 U.S. at 308 (explaining the Court’s broad judicial construction of the various Patent 
Acts).  Nevertheless, statutory interpretation, particularly regarding newer technologies, 
has led to denial or questionability of patent protection for particular subject matter 
including software, see infra note 37, genetically engineered organisms, Chakrabarty, 
447 U.S. at 306 (noting the Patent Examiner and the Patent Office Board of Appeals’ 
rejection of patentability of a micro-organism), and under recently overruled doctrines, 
business methods.  State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 
1368, 1375–80 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (reversing a District Court judgment based on the now 
invalid “business method exception” that business methods were not statutory subject 
matter). 
 36. While revolutionary technology alone may raise concerns about patentability, 
economic impact may push these concerns to the forefront.  In the past fifty years, the 
U.S. economy has grown rapidly, driven heavily by intellectual property such as patents.  
In 1947, intellectual property comprised just under ten percent of all U.S. exports.  By 
the early 1990s that figure grew to well over fifty percent of all exports.  Many of these 
exports include nontraditional technologies such as integrated circuits, software, and, 
more recently, biotechnology.  WARSHOFSKY, supra note 2, at 5–10. 
 37. In some cases, the problem lies in the intangible nature of certain types of 
innovations such as software.  See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72 (1972) 
(noting uncertainty regarding the patentability of software and suggesting that 
patentability of software is a “policy matter” to which the court is not “competent to 
speak”).  In other cases, particular subject matter, such as living organisms, might 
initially be viewed as nonstatutory subject matter.  See, e.g., Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 
306 (reversing the patent office’s rejection based on the Patent Board of Appeals’ 
conclusion that “[35 U.S.C.] § 101 was not intended to cover living things such as these 
laboratory created micro-organisms”). 
 38. Act of July 19, 1952, Pub. L. No. 593, 66 Stat. 797 (codified as amended in 35 
U.S.C. §§ 1–376). 




on previous statutory and common law definitions.39  Included among the 
protectable categories of invention is any “process, machine, manufacture, 
or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.”40
Current patentable subject matter is construed broadly and may include 
nontraditional inventions such as software and “business methods.”41  As 
one recent Supreme Court decision has held, patentable subject matter 
now includes “anything under the sun that is made by man.”42  
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has not clearly extended software 
patent protection beyond software used to control or manipulate physical 
entities or processes.43  The Federal Circuit has, however, attempted to 
broaden this protection to include any form of software.44
 39. Several patent acts preceded the 1952 Act, including acts of 1790, 1793, and 
1836.  The 1952 Patent Act represented the first codification under the United States 
Code, which was first established in 1926.  The 1952 Patent Act codification primarily 
retained statutory acts passed from 1874 onward as well as much of the 
contemporaneous case law.  STOBBS, supra note 29, at 15–24. 
 40. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).  In addition to meeting the statutory subject matter 
categories of § 101, the invention must also be useful or have utility; however, utility is 
interpreted broadly.  As a consequence, utility does not currently present a high bar to 
patentability.  Certain subject matters, such as perpetual motion machines, are not 
patentable because they lack credible utility; i.e., they do not actually work.  Historically, 
certain types of morally undesirable inventions, such as gambling machines, were also 
considered to lack beneficial utility and were, therefore, unpatentable.  See, e.g., Juicy 
Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (referencing 
previously ineligible subject matter lacking beneficial utility, including inventions used 
for gambling, poisoning people, promoting debauchery, or assassination).  In addition to 
utility, the invention must be new or novel.  35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).  The novelty 
requirement is not absolute, but any previous printed publication from anywhere in the 
world, or previous use or sale more than one year prior to the date of a patent 
application, can bar issuance or invalidate an already issued patent.  Id.  This 
requirement is probably one of the most litigated in patent law as accused infringers have 
a very strong incentive to search for any possible prior version of the invention, known 
in the patent trade as prior art, given the typically limited search required by the patent 
office.  Finally, a patented invention must be nonobvious.  35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).  This 
requirement is the most amorphous, making nonobviousness a subjective matter based 
on what a person having ordinary skill in the respective field would have deemed 
obvious at the time of invention.  Id. 
 41. One commentator suggests the common thread joining all statutory subject 
matter is human control.  STOBBS, supra note 29, at 205.  Under this view, if humans 
have the power to change something, or make it exist or cease to exist, it is patentable 
subject matter.  Id. 
 42. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (quoting S. REP. NO. 1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. 
REP. NO. 1923, at 6 (1952)). 
 43. The Supreme Court last visited the software patent issue in 1981, validating 
use of software in connection with machinery for rubber molding.  See Diamond v. 
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 184–85 (1981) (holding that a rubber molding process is patentable 
even if it uses software in its implementation).  In this case, the software was part of a 
process patent “which includes in several of its steps the use of a mathematical formula 
and a programmed digital computer . . . .”  Id. at 177. 
 44. See, e.g., State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 
1368, 1373–77 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (providing protection for software implementing 
numerical algorithms that produce intangible results expressed in the form of numbers as 
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C.  Patent Claims 
In addition to meeting the subject matter requirements, each patent 
must describe the invention in a written “specification.”45  The 
specification must be concluded with one or more elements known as 
claims.46  The claims are the most significant and important feature of 
any patent because they define the patent’s scope.47  When an inventor 
seeks to enforce his patent against a potential infringer, it is the scope of 
the claims, rather than anything else in the patent, that determines the 
extent of what is protected.48
A related role of patent claims is to classify the invention into one of 
two general subject categories, an apparatus or a process.49  These two 
well as “business methods,” which are novel processes or methods of doing business). 
 45. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).  This requirement serves several purposes including 
demonstrating that the inventor had possession, or the ability and knowledge to actually 
make the invention, and has communicated this in the patent application.  See Gould v. 
Hellwarth, 472 F.2d 1383, 1387–88 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (denying patent because application 
failed to enable a person skilled in the art to make the invention).  The invention must be 
described sufficiently to enable another “skilled in the art to which it pertains” to make 
and use the invention.  35 U.S.C. § 112.  This requirement serves the basic patent 
function of providing disclosure to enable the public to both improve upon the invention 
and practice it once the patent has expired without resorting to excessive 
experimentation.  See, e.g., Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 750 
F.2d 1569, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (discussing enablement and noting that a patent will 
not be held to be nonenabling because of a need for experimentation as long as the 
experimentation required is not undue).  If the inventor envisions a particular “best 
mode,” or best way of making or using the invention, this must also be described in the 
patent.  35 U.S.C. § 112.  The best mode requirement serves to protect the public’s 
interest in a full disclosure of the invention, as envisioned by the inventor, at the time the 
application is filed and preclude monopoly protection when the inventor’s knowledge 
has not been fully disclosed.  See Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Indus. Inc., 913 F.2d 923, 926 
(Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 46. Claims are required to “particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[] the 
subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.”  35 U.S.C. § 112. 
 47. Claims are commonly analogized to the metes and bounds of real property as a 
means of staking out the boundaries of the invention.  See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. 
Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997).  Metes and bounds refers to the 
“territorial limits of real property” as used in the real property context.  They are 
commonly described in “deeds and surveys to establish the boundary lines of land.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1005 (7th ed. 1999). 
 48. Determination of claim scope and meaning is a primary requirement in any 
patent litigation.  Before a potentially infringing device or process can be analyzed, the 
scope of the patent must be determined by examining the claims.  This is a function for a 
judge, not a jury.  See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 384–90 
(1996) (creating the so called Markman hearing which requires a judge, rather than a 
jury, to construct patent claims). 
 49. In addition, a patent claim can cover a composition of matter.  35 U.S.C. § 101 




classifications derive from the general subject matter categories50 and 
have a significant impact on the infringement analysis.51
One way to claim an invention is as a process or method.52  A process 
patent claim typically recites a series of sequential steps or actions 
required to complete some action producing a useful result.  Because this 
sequential approach models the operation of processor instruction 
execution in a computer, software patents are frequently written in this 
process or method form.53  An apparatus claim describes a device composed 
of a series of components that, when taken as a whole, constitute the 
patented invention.54  Software can also be claimed in this way as a 
component or element of a device or apparatus.55  Traditionally, software 
was claimed primarily in process form; however, recent patents often 
claim software in both forms, providing broad protection with the 
advantages of both claiming methods.56  As discussed in detail later in 
this Comment, the method of claiming should play a key role in 
assessing whether a software component should enjoy protection under  
§ 271(f).  Only software claimed in apparatus form should receive 
protection.57
(2000).  Because software does not fall within composition of matter claims (software is 
not matter), this type of claim is not discussed here. 
 50. Process means a “process, art or method, and includes a new use of a known 
process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material.”  35 U.S.C. § 100(b) 
(2000).  In the patent context, a process or method generally refers to a series of steps for 
doing something, as opposed to a machine or device.  A patent may, however, include 
claims of both types, with one or more covering a method of doing something and other 
claims describing a particular device for performing the process.  See, e.g., U.S. Patent 
No. 6,609,431 (issued Aug. 26, 2003) (teaching a flow meter patented by the author for 
measurement of viscous fluids that includes both process and apparatus claims). 
 51. See infra text accompanying notes 211–22. 
 52. 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
 53. STOBBS, supra note 29, at 521–633 (providing examples of typical software 
patents and noting that process claims are the most common form of software patent 
protection). 
 54. See Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152 
(1950).  Apparatus claims would fall under the statutory categories of “machine [or] 
manufacture” or an improvement of either of these.  See 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
 55. An example is the author’s patent for a flowmeter which includes mechanical, 
electronic, and software components, which, when taken as a whole, comprise the 
invention.  See U.S. Patent No. 6,609,431 (issued Aug. 26, 2003). 
 56. Id. 
 57. This proposed limitation is based on an earlier district court case that limited 
infringement liability under § 271(f) when the allegedly infringed patent only claimed 
the invention in process form.  See Enpat, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 6 F. Supp. 2d 537, 538 
(E.D. Va. 1998).  For discussion of this proposed limitation, see infra notes 213–22 and 
accompanying text. 
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D.  Development of Software Patentability 
The fundamental question of whether software should be considered a 
component for liability purposes under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) must rest, in 
part, on whether software itself is patentable subject matter.  While the 
individual components of a particular invention may not enjoy patent 
protection under § 271(f),58 it would be inconsistent to impose liability 
for a component that could not, rather than does not, enjoy patent 
protection.59  Therefore, this Comment starts with the basic assumption 
that to be considered a component for liability purposes under § 271(f), 
the component itself must fall within the statutory subject matter 
categories.60
Digital computers and the software required to make them operable61 
first emerged in the 1940s;62 however, acceptance of software as 
patentable subject matter was not firmly established until the mid 
 58. Section 271(f) does not specifically define “component.”  However, the 
context implies that a component must be some subset of the patented invention, and 
therefore not necessarily protected, itself, if it does not reach all the claims of the 
invention.  See 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2000). 
 59. The categories of subject matter that clearly do not enjoy patent protection are 
abstract algorithms, laws of nature, physical phenomena, and products of nature, such as 
living organisms.  Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309–10 (1980).  The living 
organism limitation does not apply to living organisms that have been fundamentally 
modified by man and would not be found in nature, such as gene-spliced bacteria.  Id.  
Therefore, under this proposed subject matter limitation, no protection would be 
provided for components such as chemicals merely found in nature, living organisms, or 
their byproducts that were discovered in the wild and not modified in any way, even if 
they were a substantial part of the invention. 
 60. As noted previously, this is not currently considered a limitation.  However, 
neither the Supreme Court nor Congress has made a final definitive statement regarding 
the scope of software patentability.  See infra notes 61–83 and accompanying text. 
 61. The general model for a computer includes hardware comprised of electronic 
circuitry implementing data storage and digital logic functions.  Software provides the 
instructions that control how the digital logic functions operate.  One scholar compares a 
computer program to a machine: 
The program text represents the machine before it has been turned on.  The 
executing program represents the powered-up machine in active operation.  
There is no fundamental distinction between the passive program text and the 
active executing program, just as there is none between a machine before and 
after it is turned on. 
DAVID GELERNTER & SURESH JAGANNATHAN, PROGRAMMING LINGUISTICS 2 (1990). 
 62. The first electronic digital computer, the ENIAC (Electronic Numerical 
Integrator and Computer), was completed in 1946 for the military.  ENIAC’s inventors 
subsequently developed the first commercial electronic computer, the UNIVAC I 
(Universal Automatic Computer), in the early 1950s.  ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 519–20 (Supp. 2002). 




1990s.63  For this reason, it is questionable whether Congress, in adopting 
the extraterritorial infringement provisions included in the Patent Law 
Amendments of 1984,64 considered software as a possible component for 
infringement purposes under § 271(f).65  Nevertheless, a brief review of the 
evolution of acceptance of software as patentable subject matter provides 
some insight into similar concerns about software’s intangible nature 
and suggests that software should not be distinguished from mechanical 
components under § 271(f) merely because of its nonphysical nature. 
Through the 1960s, there was a general view that software was not 
patentable subject matter.  A 1966 Presidential Commission recommended 
that software not be patentable.66  The issue of software patentability 
first received Supreme Court attention in 1972 with a landmark case, 
Gottschalk v. Benson.67  Benson rejected patentability of mathematical 
algorithms, which are the heart of most software, but did not explicitly 
reject software patentability.68  A 1978 Supreme Court case, Parker v. 
 63. In 1996, the United States Patent and Trademark Office finally provided some 
guidance for its examiners in reviewing computer inventions by issuing Examination 
Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, reprinted in 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER 
& INFO. L. 311 (1998).  The Federal Circuit removed perhaps the last basic limitation on 
software patentability in 1998 by holding that a program that merely manipulates 
numbers, as long as the process produces a “‘useful, concrete, and tangible result’ . . .  
renders it statutory subject matter, even if the useful result is expressed [only] in 
numbers . . . .”  State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). 
 64. Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-622, 98 Stat. 3383.  
Portions of these amendments  were subsequently codified as 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1)–(2) 
(2000). 
 65. There are at least two reasons for questioning whether Congress considered 
software in this context.  First, the status of software as patentable subject matter was not 
clearly established at this time.  See infra notes 66–71.  In addition, the state of the art in 
computer hardware and the associated software was much more limited than it is today.  
Current embedded applications where computer hardware and software replaces older 
analog electronics or physical components, such as the machine parts in Deepsouth, were 
much less pervasive in the early 1980s.  See infra notes 163–165. 
 66. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM 12–13 
(1966).  This rejection was based in part on rejection of direct attempts to patent 
programs and subsequent indirect attempts to work around these rejections.  The 
Commission found that the patent office rejected direct patenting because of an inability 
to determine a patent’s novelty: “reliable searches would not be feasible or economic 
because of the tremendous volume of prior art being generated.  Without this search, the 
patenting of programs would be tantamount to mere registration and the presumption of 
validity [associated with issued patents] would be all but nonexistent.”  Id. at 13.  In 
response, attorneys tried to work around this direct ban by clever claiming efforts, such 
as drafting the claims as a “process, . . . rather than as a program itself.”  Id.  The result 
of these efforts was to further confuse the issue.  The report therefore recommended that 
any form of patenting “should not be permitted.”  Id. 
 67. 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
 68. Although Benson did not expressly reject software patentability, it did reject 
mathematical algorithms as being analogous to laws of nature that are not patentable 
subject matter.  The algorithm at issue in Benson implemented a BCD to binary 
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Flook,69 further muddied the waters by holding that “a claim for an 
improved method of calculation [in the form of software in a digital 
computer], even when tied to a specific end use, is unpatentable subject 
matter under § 101.”70  As a consequence, software, which could be viewed 
as merely a set of mathematical algorithms, was basically disregarded as 
patentable subject matter until the 1980s.71
A 1981 Supreme Court case, Diamond v. Diehr, reopened the door for 
software patentability.72  Diehr involved a process for curing rubber that 
included software for calculating cure time.  The patent was rejected as 
nonstatutory by the patent office.73  In reversing this rejection, the 
Supreme Court distinguished the practical use of computation in this 
context from proscribed uses, such as abstract ideas.  By allowing 
protection, the Court recognized the use of software as a component of a 
machine, such as the rubber making device at issue, that produces some 
tangible, physical output—in this case, cured rubber.74  This holding 
suggested that the Court finally recognized that software can play a role 
equivalent to hardware in machines and devices and might, in effect, be 
interchangeable with hardware in some applications.75
conversion that required a series of bit manipulations and produced only numbers as the 
output.  Id. at 65–68.  While Benson was read by many as rejecting software as 
patentable subject matter, the Court did not explicity reject software as patentable subject 
matter, but rather implied that it might be protectable if tied to a specific practical 
application rather than just producing numbers as an output.  As Justice Douglas wrote, 
“The mathematical formula involved here has no substantial practical application . . . and 
in practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself.”  Id. at 71–72.  Nevertheless, 
one commentator noted that “despite the express statement that this was not a prohibition 
on patents for computer programs, some concluded that computer programs were not 
patentable.” STOBBS, supra note 29, at 42. 
 69. 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
 70. Id. at 595 n.18.  This dismissal of algorithms tied to a specific end use 
appeared to close the “practical application” exception implied by Benson and therefore 
to software patentability in general. 
 71. STOBBS, supra note 29, at 41. 
 72. 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
 73. In the patent application process, the process claims relating to calculating 
curing time were rejected solely because they were drawn to nonstatutory subject matter 
in light of Benson.  Id. at 179–81. 
 74. The Court held that “[t]ransformation and reduction of an article ‘to a different 
state or thing’ is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not include 
particular machines.” Id. at 184 (quoting Benson, 409 U.S. at 70). 
 75. The patent at issue in Diehr was claimed as a process.  The Court noted that 
processes enjoy statutory protection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and explicitly recognized the 
interchangeability of hardware and software in specific process steps by noting that 
“[o]ur conclusion regarding respondents’ claims is not altered by the fact that in several 
steps of the process a . . . digital computer [rather than an electronic or mechanical 




Diehr was the last Supreme Court case addressing software patentability; 
however, the Federal Circuit continued to expand software protection.  
In In re Alappat,76 the Federal Circuit extended protection to software 
that enhances video displays on an oscilloscope.  In In re Lowry,77 the 
court extended protection to data structures stored in memory, and in In 
re Beauregard78 the court authorized protection of software as articles of 
manufacture.  In the most significant recent software case, State Street 
Bank and Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group,79 the Federal Circuit 
rejected earlier limitations that software provide tangible results, allowing 
claims for an invention that merely processes and outputs numbers.  
State Street involved a data processing system, claimed in apparatus 
form, that processed daily stock prices and output share value, both in 
the form of numbers only.  Judge Rich characterized the claims at issue 
as a machine composed of software elements.80  He then erased the 
earlier conceptual distinction between software and hardware, writing 
that the relevant test was not whether the device is composed of hardware 
or software elements but that it produces “a useful, concrete . . . result.”81
These Supreme Court and Federal Circuit cases demonstrate an 
increasingly expansive view of software patent protection as well as 
recognition of software’s importance within the patent system.  This 
indicates that the law will recognize software as patentable subject 
matter—irrespective of whether tangible, physical results are produced—as 
long as it conforms with traditional limitations on protection for mere 
abstract concepts.82  As a consequence, software should clearly be given 
legal recognition as a potential component part of a machine or apparatus, 
or even as a standalone machine itself.83
device is] used.”  Id. at 185.  Moreover, the Court held that “a claim drawn to subject 
matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory because [it uses] a computer 
[program].” Id. at 181. 
 76. 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994).  Alappat’s invention related to a method for 
creating a smooth oscilloscope waveform on a cathode ray tube display, similar to 
typical television tubes.  Id. at 1538–39.  The Federal Circuit reversed a Patent Board of 
Appeals decision rejecting patentability of a oscilloscope display raterizer function that 
could be programmed on a general purpose computer.  Id. at 1545.  The rejected claims 
at issue in Alappat were made in apparatus, rather than process, form.  Id. at 1538–39. 
 77. 32 F.3d 1579, 1580–85 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 78. 53 F.3d 1583, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 79. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 80. Judge Rich, writing for a three judge panel, held that “[w]hen independent 
claim 1 is properly construed . . . , it is directed to a machine . . . .” Id. at 1371. 
 81. Id. at 1373. 
 82. The Court has frequently emphasized that mere abstract ideas, mathematical 
formulas, or laws of nature are not patentable.  See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 
63, 67 (1972); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981). 
 83. In Alappat, claim 15 consists of a rasterizer system (machine) that includes 
analog and digital hardware as well as distinct, protectable software elements.  In re 
Allappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1538–39 (Fed. Cir. 1994).  In State Street, computer hardware 
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III.  PATENT INFRINGEMENT AND EXTRATERRITORIAL ACTIVITIES 
Once a patent is issued, the owner has the legal right to prevent others 
from infringing his invention.  Infringement involves any “act that interferes 
with one of the exclusive rights of a patent, copyright, or trademark 
owner.”84  The various intellectual property regimes each include unique 
statutory requirements for infringement.85  As a general rule, however, 
infringement involves misuse of a protected right within defined subject 
matter,86 temporal limits,87 and geographical limits.88  Infringement liability 
under § 271(f) is an exception to this rule and imposes liability in a way 
that is directly counter to these traditional subject matter and geographic 
limitations.89
A.  Direct Infringement 
The most common and straightforward form of patent infringement is 
direct infringement.90  Direct infringement liability is imposed on 
anyone who “without authority makes, uses, . . . or sells any patented 
invention, within the United States . . . .”91  There are several important 
limitations to direct infringement that narrow potential liability.  First, 
the scope of what is covered by the patent must be assessed and then 
compared to the potentially infringing device.92  A patent is directly 
infringed only if all the claimed elements are present in the allegedly 
and software comprise the entire claimed invention under claim 1.  As Judge Rich held, 
this claim “is directed to a machine.”  149 F.3d at 1375.  Therefore, the entire software 
system is the machine and the individual software elements are its component parts. 
 84. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 785 (7th ed. 1999). 
 85. Patent infringement is statutorily detailed in Title 35 of the United States Code.  
See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000).  Analagous copyright infringement provisions are included 
in title 17.  See 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2000 & Supp. 2004). 
 86. Patent infringement applies only to a “patented invention,” as set out explicitly 
by the patent’s claims.  See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), (c). 
 87. Patent duration is currently codified as “ending 20 years from the date on 
which the application for the patent was filed in the United States . . . .”  35 U.S.C. § 
154(a)(2) (2000). 
 88. Direct patent infringement applies only to those who make, use, offer to sell, or 
sell any patented invention “within the United States.”  35 U.S.C. § 271(a).  The term 
“United States” is defined as “the United States of America, its territories and 
possessions.”  35 U.S.C. § 100(c) (2000). 
 89. This distinction is discussed later in this Comment.  See infra notes 119–30 
and accompanying text. 
 90. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). 
 91. Id. 
 92. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 384 (1996). 




infringing device; a device that does not include all the claimed elements 
does not infringe.93  The second limitation is territorial—the infringing 
activity must occur within the United States.94  Courts have long held 
patent protection to this basic geographic limitation.95  Therefore, 
anyone making, using, or selling a device that includes all the claimed 
elements outside the territorial limits of the United States does not 
infringe under traditional infringement analysis.96
B.  The Extraterritorial Manufacturing Problem 
As a consequence of these limitations, a manufacturer would not 
traditionally be liable for making some or all of the components of an 
infringing product if they completed assembly outside the country.97  
This led some companies to procure most or all of the components of an 
infringing device domestically.  To avoid infringement liability, they 
merely shipped the unassembled parts overseas for final assembly and 
sale.98
i.  Deepsouth v. Laitram 
The Supreme Court confronted the extraterritorial manufacturing 
problem in an important 1972 case, Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram 
Corp.99  Deepsouth strictly limited direct infringement liability under § 
271(a)100 to making a patented invention when the assembly occurs 
overseas.  The Laitram Corporation was actively involved in design and 
manufacturing of mechanical devices for shrimp processing and held 
two valid U.S. patents for machinery used in the process of deveining 
 93. Larami Corp. v. Amron, 27 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1280, 1283 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (citing 
London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538–39 (Fed. Cir. 1991)), aff’d, 
1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 8953 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 19, 1996). 
 94. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).  The United States includes “the United States of America, 
its territories and possessions.”  35 U.S.C. § 100(c). 
 95. See, e.g., Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 650 
(1915); Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 195 (1857). 
 96. See infra notes 116–17 and accompanying text. 
 97. Note also the use limitation.  Section 271(a) proscribes use of a patented 
device but not mere possession.  Therefore, if someone merely owns, but does not use, a 
patented product, he is not liable for patent infringement under § 271(f).  He may, 
however, be liable if he made the device, even if he did not use it.  See 35 U.S.C. § 
271(a). 
 98. This practice would understandably raise the ire of competitors, particularly if 
the final assembly was merely a trivial effort.  Nevertheless, as noted previously, supra 
note 93, direct infringement cannot occur unless all the elements of the claimed 
invention are met, which requires complete assembly into an operable unit. 
 99. 406 U.S. 518, 519 (1972). 
 100. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).  Among other actions, § 271(a) imposes liability for 
“making” an invention that is covered by the claims of a patent.  Id. 
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shrimp.101  Both of these patents were combination patents, a common 
form of patented invention made from a series of unpatented parts 
where: 
“[n]one of the parts referred to are new, and none are claimed as new . . . or 
stated to produce any given result.  The end . . . [is] accomplished by the union 
of all, arranged and combined together in the manner described.  And this 
combination, composed of all the parts mentioned . . . is stated to be the 
improvement, and is the thing patented.”102
The value of this type of invention lies in the combination rather than the 
individual parts.103  Therefore, while individual parts of these inventions 
would not enjoy patent protection, their assembly into the complete 
invention constitutes infringement.  This distinction is important in 
understanding the scope of the term “components,” as used in the 
extraterritorial infringement provisions of § 271(f).104
 101. Deepsouth, 406 U.S at 519–20.  Deveining is the process of opening and 
removing the shrimp’s intestines, also known as veins (or sand bags), to make them more 
palatable.  Id. at 519 (quoting Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., 301 F. Supp. 
1037, 1040 (E.D. La. 1969)).  The process also removes the shell, making the shrimp 
edible.  Deepsouth, 406 U.S at 519 (quoting Laitram, 301 F. Supp. at 1040).  One patent, 
issued in 1954, covered a “slitter” which exposed the shrimp’s veins by using water 
pressure to force the shrimp through a series of razor blades, which slit the shrimp open.  
Deepsouth, 406 U.S at 520.  The second patent, issued in 1958, disclosed a “tumbler,” a 
device to mechanically remove the veins from shrimp whose backs were opened by the 
slitter.  Id. 
 102. Id. at 521 (quoting Prouty v. Ruggles, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 336, 341 (1842)). 
 103. While none of the components of these machines enjoyed patent protection, 
both of Laitram’s inventions were nevertheless protected for “in some way exceed[ing] 
the sum of [their] parts.”  Id. at 521–22 (quoting Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. 
Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152 (1950)).  As the court notes: 
The slitter’s elements . . . were: an inclined trough, a “knife” (actually, knives) 
positioned in the trough, and a means (water sprayed from jets) to move the 
shrimp down the trough.  The tumbler’s elements include a “lip,” a “support 
member,” and a “means” (water thrust from jets).  As is usual in combination 
patents, none of the elements in either of these patents were themselves 
patentable at the time of the patent, nor are they now. . . .  Invention was 
recognized because Laitram’s assignors combined ordinary elements in an 
extraordinary way—a novel union of old means was designed to achieve new 
ends. 
Id. at 520 (citations omitted).  This synergy of components was also described by the 
District Court as being protectable because “when combined [the parts] co-act in such a 
manner to perform a new function and produce new results.”  Laitram, 301 F. Supp. at 
1063. 
 104. Although the term “component” is not explicitly defined in the patent act, it 
was likely intended to refer to an article such as the parts described here, which do not 
enjoy patent protection by themselves, but contribute to a combination invention such as 
the shrimp deveining machine at issue in Deepsouth.  Similar language is used in the 




Deepsouth made similar machines and held related patents.105 The 
District Court established, however, that Laitram had the “superior 
claim”106 to essentially identical machinery and was, therefore, entitled 
to exclude Deepsouth from the domestic market107 and exercise standard 
remedies.108  Deepsouth sought to modify a complete injunction imposed 
by the Fifth Circuit109 allowing it to continue its practice of shipping its 
deveining machinery to foreign customers for use abroad.  This practice 
consisted of shipping the domestically infringing machine to foreign 
customers in three separate boxes, each containing only parts of the 
nearly two-ton machine.  Assembly abroad could be completed in less 
than one hour.110
In a close decision,111 the Court held that Deepsouth’s practice of 
shipping the unassembled machine abroad did not constitute infringement.  
The Court first dismissed liability for contributory infringement, noting 
that “‘if there is no [direct] infringement of a patent there can be no 
contributory infringer.’”112  It then dismissed Laitram’s suggestion that 
statutory provisions addressing contributory liability for domestic activities.  See, e.g., 35 
U.S.C. § 271(c) (2000). 
 105. Deepsouth, 406 U.S at 519. 
 106. Id. (citing Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., 443 F.2d 928, 934 (5th 
Cir. 1971)). 
 107. A key concept of patent law is the exclusion right of patent protection.  A 
patent does not provide any rights of use, it only allows a patent holder to exclude others 
from the market.  This exclusion principle includes the right to prevent others from 
“making, using, . . . or selling the invention throughout the United States . . . .” 35 U.S.C. 
§ 154(a)(1) (2000).  The Court describes this as “the keystone provision of the patent 
code.” Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 522.  Once the Court established priority of invention, 
Laitram was entitled to enjoin Deepsouth from the domestic market for making, using, or 
selling any invention that fell within Laitram’s patent claims.  Id. at 519–22. 
 108. Typical patent remedies include injunctions as well as damages.  Injunctions 
are the standard remedy to preclude present and future infringement.  35 U.S.C. § 283 
(2000).  In addition, liability can be imposed for past damages including actual damages 
or a reasonable royalty.  35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000).  Neither the injunction nor the award of 
damages for domestic infringement was disputed in this case.  Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 
523. 
 109. Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 524.  The injunction against this type of component 
export imposed by the Fifth Circuit was in conflict with previous decisions finding no 
liability for component export by the Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits.  Id. at 525.  
The Fifth Circuit’s panel decision held that allowing component export was “an 
artificial, technical construction . . . [that] [subverted] the Constitutional scheme of 
promoting ‘the Progress of Science and useful Arts,’” as provided in the Constitution.  
Id. (quoting Laitram, 443 F.2d at 939 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8)). 
 110. Id. at 523–24. 
 111. The Court’s decision was five to four.  See id. at 532 (listing four dissenting 
Justices). 
 112. Id. at 526 (quoting Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 
677 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting on other grounds)).  There is no direct 
infringement here because the purchaser of the machine is abroad and presumably any 
making or use of the machine will occur outside the United States.  See 35 U.S.C. § 
271(a),(c). 
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Deepsouth makes and sells the invention.  In order to sell, Deepsouth 
must first make the patented invention, and not something less that “fell 
short of infringement.”113  In rejecting export of components as making 
the patented product, the Court addressed a conflict over the definition 
of what constitutes making114 and cited “a line of decisions so firmly 
embedded in our patent law as to be unassailable absent a congressional 
recasting of the statute.”115  This precedent limits liability for a 
combination patent to only an “operable assembly of the whole and not 
the manufacture of its parts.”116  Therefore, if components are merely 
exported, there is no liability for making the patented invention when 
assembly occurs abroad, and, consequently, there will be no liability for 
selling the invention because the invention was not made in the United 
States.  The Court concluded by noting that inventors seeking to gain 
extraterritorial protection have a satisfactory means of securing it by 
seeking foreign patent protection.117  The Court also noted that Congress 
is free at any time to redefine the outer boundary of patent protection if it 
so desires.118
 113. Id. at 527. 
 114. The Fifth Circuit adopted a definition that “‘makes’ means what it ordinarily 
connotes—the substantial manufacture of the constituent parts of the machine.”  
Laitram, 443 F.2d at 939 (emphasis added).  This conflicts with earlier precedent from 
the Second Circuit that held that something is not “made” until it is completely 
assembled.  Radio Corp. of Am. v. Andrea, 79 F.2d 626, 628 (2d Cir. 1935) (“No wrong 
is done the patentee until the combination is formed.”). 
 115. Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 528. 
 116. Id.  The Court cited an earlier decision that held that “a patent on a 
combination is a patent on the assembled or functioning whole, not on the separate 
parts.”  Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680, 684 
(1944); see also Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 344 
(1961) (“[I]f anything is settled in the patent law, it is that the combination patent covers 
only the totality of the elements in the claim and that no element, separately viewed, is 
within the grant.”). 
 117. Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 531.  The Court also noted that Laitram did not 
adequately explain why it had not secured foreign patent protection despite the fact that 
the wording of 35 U.S.C. § 154 reveals a Congressional intent to have inventors seek 
foreign protection for overseas activities.  Id. 
 118. Id. at 530.  When Congress drafted the infringement statute it gave no 
indication that it intended to expand existing case law regarding patent scope.  The Court 
also noted the “[n]ation’s historical antipathy to monopoly and . . . repeated 
congressional efforts to preserve and foster competition,” suggesting a strong preference 
against expanded patent protection.  Id. (citation omitted). 




ii.  Congressional Response to Deepsouth, 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) 
At several points in Deepsouth, the Supreme Court pointed out the 
Congressional prerogative of changing patent law by statute.119  It took 
twelve years, but Congress responded by enacting The Patent Law 
Amendments of 1984,120 the first extraterritorial infringement provision 
since the 1952 Patent Act.121  The legislative history of § 271(f) is fairly 
sparse, with no House or Senate Reports, and only a brief analysis 
provided in the Congressional Record.122  The Congressional Record 
states that the Patent Law Amendments were intended to: 
prevent copiers from avoiding U.S. patents by supplying components of a 
patented product in this country so that the assembly of the components may be 
completed abroad.  This proposal responds to the United States Supreme Court 
decision in Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972), 
concerning the need for a legislative solution to close a loophole in patent 
law.123
This brief section represents the extent of legislative history regarding 
§ 271(f).  The remainder of the Congressional report merely summarizes 
the statutory language of § 271(f), element by element.124
iii.  35 U.S.C. § 271(f) Statutory Provisions 
Section 271(f) is divided into two subsections, § 271(f)(1) and § 
271(f)(2).  Both subsections require three basic elements to impose 
liability: knowledge, component status, and supply.  The language of §§ 
271(f)(1) and (2) is similar to existing statutory infringement provisions 
for induced and contributory infringement, but, unlike these provisions, 
neither requires a direct infringement to impose liability.125
 119. In addressing case law defining “making,” the Court noted that a contrary 
interpretation would be improper “absent a congressional recasting of the statute.” Id. at 
528.  “When, as here, the Constitution is permissive, the sign of how far Congress has 
chosen to go can come only from Congress.”  Id. at 530.  “We would require a clear and 
certain signal from Congress before approving [the position advocating extraterritorial 
liability] . . . .”  Id. at 531. 
 120. Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-622, 98 Stat. 3383 
(codified in part as 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)). 
 121. The Act adds 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) and 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2), and adds a 
number of additional patent provisions addressing statutory registration, foreign filing 
licenses, prior art, joint inventors, and arbitration of patent interferences.  Patent Law 
Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-622, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (89 Stat. 3383) 
5827–36. 
 122. “No House or Senate Report was submitted with this legislation [enacting 35 
U.S.C. § 271(f)].”  Id. at 5827. 
 123. Id. at 5828. 
 124. Id. at 5828–40. 
 125. Both induced and contributory infringement fall into the general category of 
indirect infringement.  Induced infringement was a codification of existing case law that 
TIETSWORTH 4/7/2005  1:12 PM 
[VOL. 42:  405, 2005]  Exporting Software Components 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 427 
 
Section 271(f)(1) imposes liability for anyone who knowingly 
supplies components in a manner that actively induces combination 
outside the United States where the combination would infringe if done 
within the United States.126  This subsection closely mimics the facts of 
Deepsouth where an entire unassembled device was shipped in 
component form and is analogous to induced infringement.  Liability 
under § 271(f)(1) does not require that the particular components be 
specially made for the patented invention, but does require that either the 
entire infringing invention or a substantial portion be shipped. 
Section 271(f)(2) addresses a different concern and is similar to induced 
infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b).  Liability under § 271(f)(2) is 
imposed when one supplies a component that is especially made or 
adapted for use in the invention with knowledge that the combination 
would result in infringement if done within the United States.127  Under 
§ 271(f)(2), liability can be imposed even for export of a single 
component, provided it was made with knowledge of the patented 
invention and has no other substantial noninfringing use.128  Section 
“extended infringement liability to persons who encouraged and assisted the 
infringement of others.”  SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 24, at 472; see also 35 
U.S.C. § 271(b) (2000).  Contributory infringement concerns the “situation where one 
party sells a specially manufactured component that the customer intends to employ in 
the practice of a patented invention.” SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 24, at 472; see 
also 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2000). 
 126. The complete provision reads: 
Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the 
United States all or a substantial portion of the components of a patented 
invention, where such components are uncombined in whole or in part, in such 
manner as to actively induce the combination of such components outside the 
United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination 
occurred within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer. 
35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) (2000). 
 127. The language of § 271(f)(2) states: 
Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the 
United States any component of a patented invention that is especially made or 
especially adapted for use in the invention and not a staple article or 
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, where such 
component is uncombined in whole or in part, knowing that such component is 
so made or adapted and intending that such component will be combined 
outside of the United States in a manner that would infringe that patent if such 
combination occurred within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer. 
35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2) (2000). 
 128. This provision is similar to contributory infringement liability under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(c), which imposes liability for selling or offering to sell a “component of a 
patented machine, . . . constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to 
be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and 




271(f)(1) could implicate liability for software export if general purpose 
software was exported as part of a protection combination invention, as 
long as a substantial portion of the components were exported.  
Conversely, § 271(f)(2) liability could arise in the software context if a 
specific code were developed to implement functionality included in a 
patented invention, even if the patent enjoyed no international protection 
and the competing device were manufactured outside the United States.  
Because liability under this section is different from traditional 
infringement provisions, a proposal for bounding it in the context of 
software inventions under § 271(f) is presented in Part V of this Comment. 
iv.  Appellate Interpretation of § 271(f) Infringement 
Cases involving patent law are under exclusive federal jurisdiction,129 
and appeals of patent cases are heard exclusively by the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit or the U.S. Supreme Court.130  As a 
consequence, circuit splits, as frequently occur among the regional 
federal circuits, are nonexistent in patent law cases.  This leads to more 
uniformity and consistency in patent law interpretation. 
In the twenty years since § 271(f) was enacted, the Supreme Court has 
not heard any cases concerning this statute.  Moreover, the Federal 
Circuit has only heard two significant § 271(f) cases, both within the 
past four years.131  As a consequence, precedential interpretation of § 
271(f) is very limited.132  The two cases addressing § 271(f) provide 
limited guidance on the component question, suggesting only that § 
271(f) will be narrowly construed, but may still capture a large potential 
component export market. 
The first case, Rotec Industries, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp.,133 was 
decided in 2000 and addressed interpretation of § 271(f)(2)’s component 
supply language.134  Rotec argued that § 271(f)(2)’s language should be 
not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing 
use.”  35 U.S.C. § 271(c). 
 129. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000). 
 130. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2000). 
 131. One earlier case in 1991 addressed § 271(f) minimally, summarily dismissing 
its applicability.  See Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1360, 
1374 (Fed. Cir. 1991).  The relevance of this case is discussed in Section 4 of this 
Comment. 
 132. While binding precedential decisions from the Federal Circuit are limited, 
several district courts have heard § 271(f) cases.  Relevant reported cases are addressed 
in Part IV of this Comment. 
 133. 215 F.3d 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 134. Id. at 1257.  Section 271(f)(2) imposes liability to those who supply or cause to 
supply any component of a patented invention.  35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2) (2000).  Rotec fell 
within the scope of § 271(f)(2) rather than § 271(f)(1) because it involved overseas use 
of a crane system, where several components were specifically designed for the device, 
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broadly interpreted to include “offer[s] to supply” based on an argument 
that Congress “surely intended to strengthen the patent laws” through its 
amendment of § 271(a).135  The court roundly rejected this argument 
noting that “if Congress wanted to amend 271(f)(2) . . . it could have 
easily done so.”136  This suggests that the Federal Circuit is unwilling to 
broadly interpret § 271(f) without clear Congressional intent.  As a 
consequence, absent express language, it appears that the Federal Circuit 
will not add provisions to § 271(f) that are not textually present.137
The second significant § 271(f) case, Waymark Corp. v. Porta Systems 
Corp.,138 was decided in 2001 and addressed supply of components that 
are exported with the intention of combination, but never actually 
assembled abroad.139  As noted previously, § 271(f)(2) imposes liability 
for “supply” of components of a protected invention.140  Porta Systems 
shipped components of an infringing battery monitoring system to 
Mexico; however, the components were never assembled into the final 
product.141  The court noted, however, that the language of § 271(f)(2) 
does not specify assembly abroad as an element.  Therefore, adding an 
extraterritorial assembly requirement would improperly modify the 
statutory language.142  As a result, merely supplying components, even 
without any subsequent assembly, is sufficient to impose liability.143  
This case again suggests that the Federal Circuit will construe the 
rather than being staple articles of commerce.  Rotec, 215 F.3d at 1248–49. 
 135. Rotec, 215 F.3d at 1257.  Rotec sought to reinterpret § 271(f) in light of 
Congressional amendment of § 271(a) to include both actual sales as well as offers to 
sell, where an offer to sell is not explicitly codified in § 271(f)(2).  Id. at 1258.  Under 
this rejected broad view, liability would be imposed based on mere negotiation or 
agreement to supply without actual transfer from the United States.  Id.  In this case, the 
components never had a United States origin or transfer, being made in France, Japan, 
and China.  Id. at 1259. 
 136. Id. at 1258. 
 137. The court noted that the supply language from § 271(f) is “clear on its face.”  
Id.  Textual provisions limiting supply of components are distinguishable from an  “offer 
to supply” when no language addressing offers to supply are included in the text of § 
271(f).  Id. 
 138. 245 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 139. Id. at 1365. 
 140. See infra note 142. 
 141. Waymark, 245 F.3d at 1365. 
 142. Id. at 1368.  The court is stating that liability is imposed when someone 
supplies the component with the intention that it be assembled abroad, not that it 
ultimately is assembled.  This result might, however, create an anomaly related to supply 
of software components if the breadth of what constitutes supply is interpreted as in 
Eolas.  See infra notes 245–47 and accompanying text. 
 143. Waymark, 245 F.3d at 1368. 




language of § 271(f) narrowly and will not imply any conditions or 
extensions that are not textually present. 
In sum, the Federal Circuit has taken a narrow textual approach 
towards interpreting § 271(f).  As a consequence of Waymark, however, 
the door may be opened to expansion of § 271(f) liability.  This may 
occur because the textual language of § 271(f) imposes liability in a 
broad, unprecedented way—by merely exporting unprotected components 
to an extraterritorial location where the components do not need to be 
assembled into an infringing device.144  As a result, Waymark will 
undoubtedly create more scrutiny of potentially infringing exports.  
Moreover, with the rapid growth of software development and integration 
of software into almost every type of product, software components will 
be a natural area on which to focus this attention. 
IV.  A PROPOSED ROLE FOR SOFTWARE IN § 271(F) INFRINGEMENT 
Against this background, is there a place for software components 
under § 271(f), and, if so, how should the scope of protectability be 
bounded?  As noted previously, there is virtually no precedential case 
law on § 271(f) and only one significant case besides Eolas and Imagexpo 
that involves software.145  Therefore, the scope of software integration 
into § 271(f) is open for interpretation.  Among the three primary elements 
of § 271(f)—knowledge, component status, and supply—the knowledge 
requirement is not unique to software; however, component status and 
supply present unique issues.  Therefore, incorporation of software into       
§ 271(f) liability should focus on these two elements. 
This Comment proposes that software enjoy protection as a component 
and should not be entirely excluded under § 271(f), as proposed by 
Microsoft in Imagexpo and Eolas.146  The scope of what is protectable 
should, however, be narrowly construed and limited to software in an 
executable form that is ready to be incorporated into a product as part of 
a manufacturing process or its equivalent.  Source code or intermediate 
 144. One commentator recently predicted that “[t]he door to infringement actions 
under the underused § 271(f) provision has been cracked open; . . . the Waymark decision 
will operate to open the door wide.”  Joan E. Beckner, Note, Patent Infringement by 
Component Export: Waymark Corp. v. Porta Systems Corp. and the Extraterritorial 
Effect of U.S. Patent Law, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 803, 806 (2002). 
 145. See Enpat, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 6 F. Supp. 2d 537 (E.D. Va. 1998).  This 
case is discussed later in the Comment.  See infra notes 220–22 and accompanying text. 
 146. Microsoft claims that a component can only be a “tangible, physical element of 
a patented device,” a categorization it believes would exclude software.  Imagexpo, 
L.L.C. v. Microsoft Corp., 299 F. Supp. 2d 550, 552 (E.D. Va. 2003).  Moreover, rather 
than a “component,” Microsoft claims that software “is analogous to [a chemical] 
formula,” merely describing a repeated series of process steps.  Eolas Techs., Inc. v. 
Microsoft Corp., 274 F. Supp. 2d 972, 973 (N.D. Ill. 2003). 
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software forms, such as object code unlinked with particular memory 
spaces, should not impose liability because they are interim results of a 
design, as opposed to a manufacturing process.  In addition, only patents 
claiming a system or apparatus, as opposed to a process or method, 
should enjoy protection under § 271(f).  Because software is frequently 
claimed in the method or process form, this will further limit the scope 
of protectability. 
In addition to concerns about the scope of protection, software raises 
novel concerns regarding the supply element of § 271(f) liability.147  To 
address these concerns, this Comment proposes that liability for 
supplying a software component should be imposed irrespective of the 
means of export, as long as the channel of supply does not irreversibly 
transform the software in the supply process.  This allows for imposition 
of liability for modern electronic means of export, such as over the 
Internet or via wireless channels, in addition to actual physical transport 
and accommodates the realities of modern software distribution.  As a 
limitation to this expansive provision, however, infringement liability 
should be imposed on a one-to-one basis with the software component 
units exported.  Export of a single master disk, as was done by Microsoft 
in Eolas and Imagexpo, should not impose general liability for all 
overseas manufactured units.148  Conversely, software components 
distributed via email or downloaded from a web page should impose 
liability for each download, but only on a one-to-one basis. 
A.  Why Software Should Be Considered a Component Under § 271(f) 
A threshold concern is whether software can constitute a component at 
all for liability purposes.  If software does not fit within some acceptable 
definition of a component, discussion of infringement liability under § 
271(f) is irrelevant. 
 147. Section 271(f)(1) imposes liability on anyone who “without authority 
supplies . . . components of a patented invention . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) (2000).  
Section 271(f)(2) contains essentially the same language, imposing liability for anyone 
who “supplies . . . any component of a patented invention . . . .”  35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2) 
(2000).  Software raises issues because it can be readily distributed over the Internet, or 
via wireless channels, in addition to physical channels and, as a consequence, can be 
transformed in transmission and copied indefinitely upon receipt.  Tangible parts have 
neither of these properties. 
 148. This element of the proposal is counter to the District Court’s holding in Eolas 
that imposed liability for all units created from the single exported master disk.  Eolas, 
274 F. Supp. 2d at 974. 




What constitutes a component under § 271(f) is not explicitly defined.149  
Moreover, few cases have dealt with defining components or bounding 
their scope, although one district court case, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. 
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., proposed a context-based test.150  Nevertheless, 
a general definition can be inferred from general patent law limitations 
and § 271(f)’s legislative history.151  While not enjoying standalone patent 
 149. The term “component” is not defined in the patent statutes and is not used 
outside of § 271.  While no explicit definition of component is given, patent law allows 
for common usage, as in dictionary definitions, to construe the scope of inventions.  See, 
e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d, 
517 U.S. 370 (1996).  A typical dictionary definition describes a component as “a 
constituent part” or an “ingredient.”  WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 270 (9th 
ed. 1989).  Case law addressing related infringement provisions, such as the doctrine of 
equivalents, refers to components as composites of elements related to claim limitations.  
See Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1259 (Fed. 
Cir. 1989). 
 150. In typical cases, components are constituent parts that come together in the 
manufacturing process to make the final product.  For example, in a recent case 
involving an artificial turf product, the court considered pile fabric that was combined 
with a subsurface, sand, and resilient particles to make the final product, to be a 
component.  Fieldturf, Inc. v. Southwest Recreational Indus., Inc., 235 F. Supp. 2d 708, 
733–34 (E.D. Ky. 2002) (rejecting § 271(f)(1) liability because only one of four 
constituent components was exported), vacated in part on other grounds, 357 F.3d 1266 
(Fed. Cir. 2004).  But see Moore U.S.A. Inc. v. Standard Register Co., 144 F. Supp. 2d 
188, 195 (W.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that paper and glue are components of a protected 
document assembled abroad).  Most § 271(f) cases merely assume that parts constituting 
less than the whole are components.  Perhaps the closest attempt at defining the extent of 
components was made in a recent pharmaceutical case where the issue of chemical 
compound divisibility was raised.  In this case, a claimed element included a chemical 
ester, of which no subdivisions were identified in the patent itself or its prosecution 
history, known in patent parlance as the file wrapper.  To determine whether precursor 
elements of this compound were components, the court referenced a hypothetical person 
of ordinary skill in the art (POSA).  If this person would recognize that the compound 
had constituent parts, the court would conclude that these were components for § 271(f) 
liability purposes.  Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 
8833, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16895, at *9–10 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2001), aff’d, 326 F.3d 
1226 (Fed. Cir. 2003).  This suggests a context-based, intuitive interpretation.  If a 
person having ordinary skill in a particular art would recognize that an invention was 
composed of constituent parts, these constituent parts would be its components.  One 
recent case attempted to greatly broaden the reach of liability by arguing that merely 
having a U.S. facility, where design and development of integrated circuit chips was 
presumably done, implicated liability even when the chips were unquestionably 
manufactured outside the United States.  The plaintiff argued that “the chips, in some 
metaphysical sense, [came] from the United States [because instructions for their 
disposition also came from the United States].”  This attempt failed at the summary 
judgment stage.  Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc., No. 02-11562-RWZ, 2003 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 7598, at *1–2 (D. Mass. May 7, 2003), aff’d, 375 F.3d 1113 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 151. Reference to legislative history is an accepted means of statutory 
interpretation.  “When the language of a statute fails to provide clear and unambiguous 
direction, we may turn to the statute’s legislative history.”  Rotec Indus., Inc., v. 
Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1252 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Toibb v. Radloff, 501 
U.S. 157, 162 (1991) (“[W]e look first to the statutory language and then to the 
legislative history if the statutory language is unclear.”)). 
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protection, a component should be something that could conceivably 
enjoy statutory patent protection.152  Implicitly, a component must be an 
element of something less than a fully protectable invention.153  In the 
patent realm, a component should relate in some way to the claims of the 
infringed invention, rather than the invention’s actual embodiment.154  
Moreover, because § 271(f) liability arose in a specialized context, 
product manufacturing, a component should be in the form in which it 
will actually be used in an assembly process rather than in the form of a 
predecessor design element, such as source code.155
 152. While this requirement is not explicit, it can be reasonably implied by making 
an analogy to statutory subject matter limitations.  These limitations preclude protection 
for certain subject matter and it would seem irrational to bar patentability for a particular 
subject matter, but still impose liability when that subject matter is merely part of a 
larger apparatus invention.  See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text.  In any event, 
at this point in time, this limitation does not impose a barrier to liability for software 
components under § 271(f) because software itself has achieved a high degree of 
acceptance as patentable subject matter.  See supra notes 67–83 and accompanying text. 
 153. The language of § 271(f) refers to a component or components as a subset of 
some patentable invention and also references extraterritorial combination so as to 
produce the protectable whole, thereby implying that a component must be something 
less than a protectable invention.  See 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2000).  Moreover, the 
legislative history notes that § 271(f) was intended to overrule the Deepsouth practice of 
combining an unassembled, and consequently unprotected, combination extraterritorially.  
See supra note 123 and accompanying text; see also infra note 160. 
 154. Patent protection is limited to the claims defining the scope of the invention, 
not a particular embodiment of parts of an invention that does not include all of the 
claims.  Section 271(f) specifically addresses this concern by requiring that a component 
combined outside the United States “would infringe the patent [only] if such 
combination occurred within the United States [and was a direct infringement].”  35 
U.S.C. § 271(f)(1).  This is related to the general rule limiting a patent’s scope to its 
claims which must “particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[] the subject matter . . . 
[of the] . . . invention.”  35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).  This tie in between components and 
claim elements was noted by the Federal Circuit in a related case which stated that an 
“‘[e]lement’ may be used to mean a single [claim] limitation, but it has also been used to 
mean a series of [claim] limitations which, taken together, make up a component of the 
claimed invention.”  Corning, 868 F.2d at 1259. 
 155. This requirement can be inferred by considering the distinction between 
manufacturing and product design and development.  Design and development is the 
process of developing and transforming an idea into a product.  This process deals with 
the creative aspect of a product’s birth, whereas manufacturing deals with production 
based on “an organized plan and . . . division of labor.”  WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE 
DICTIONARY 725 (9th ed. 1989).  The design and development process, which was never 
included in § 271(f)’s case law or legislative history, should create a logical boundary on 
what constitutes a manufacturing component because nothing in the case law or 
legislative history suggests that § 271(f) should extend beyond manufacturing or 
assembly of patented inventions.  See, e.g., Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. 
L. No. 98-622, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (89 Stat. 3383) 5827; Deepsouth Packing Co. v. 
Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 532 (1972).  Moreover, any contrary interpretation of         




Software, at least in some forms, clearly meets these requirements, 
strongly suggesting it should enjoy component status under § 271(f).156  
First, while initially being questioned as patentable subject matter, 
software has become widely accepted in both apparatus and method 
form.157  Because software itself is protectable in apparatus form, it 
follows that, applying the Person of Skill in the Art (POSA) test from 
Bristol Myers,158 any distinct subprograms or software elements would 
then be components.  This POSA test can also be extended to inventions 
composed of both hardware and software to reach the same result: that 
distinct software elements of composite inventions are also components.159  
In either of these situations, an individual program, even if it does not 
explicitly enjoy protection because it lacks statutory requirements such 
as novelty or nonobviousness, would still be a constituent part of the 
protected invention and, therefore, be a component.160
Software can also be tied specifically to the patent’s claims by 
implementing claimed features.  Moreover, software in many contemporary 
inventions can be directly interchangeable with mechanical or electronic 
§ 271(f) would be fundamentally at odds with general patent law limitations on scope of 
protection and territory. 
 156. Prior to Eolas, only one significant reported case, Enpat v. Microsoft Corp., 
addressed software as a component and in that case it was rejected, although for other 
reasons.  See Enpat, Inc., v. Microsoft Corp., 6 F. Supp. 2d 537, 539 (E.D. Va. 1998) 
(rejecting application of § 271(f) to method patents, which have no “component”).  
Despite the lack of software component cases, at least a few commentators have 
suggested, without significant elaboration, that software might impose component 
liability under § 271(f).  See STOBBS, supra note 29, at 660–62 (suggesting but rejecting 
software component liability under § 271(f) in an Internet example); Keith E. Witek, 
Software Patent Infringement on the Internet and on Modern Computer Systems—Who is 
Liable for Damages?, 14 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 303, 335 (1998) 
(suggesting that software elements of a protected program might enjoy component status 
under § 271(f) when transmitted abroad time serially). 
 157. See supra notes 67–84 and accompanying text; see also STOBBS, supra note 
29, at 153–87. 
 158. This test looks at the invention or its subparts in light of a person skilled in the 
art.  If he would view the invention as having separate parts, these constitute a 
component.  Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 8833, 
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16895, at *9–10 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2001), aff’d, 326 F.3d 1226 
(Fed. Cir. 2003); see also supra note 150. 
 159. This situation is common in embedded systems which are typically composed 
of analog and digital hardware, interface elements such as sensors, and associated 
software.  All of these elements can be part of an apparatus patent’s claims. 
 160. To further elaborate, now that software has been accepted as patentable subject 
matter, see supra notes 67–84, it follows that a software invention could itself be a 
composite invention, composed of multiple independent software parts.  If the aggregate 
may enjoy protection, then the separate elements, even if not independently protectable, 
should be considered components because when added together they comprise the 
whole, just as the machine parts in Deepsouth, when put together, constituted the 
complete invention. 
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functions that would clearly enjoy protection under § 271(f).161  This is 
perhaps best seen in the context of embedded systems.  Embedded 
systems are devices or products that use processors and software 
internally without the user’s knowledge.162  Unlike desktop computers, 
the processing function is hidden from view and is effectively transparent to 
the user.  Examples abound, with use of embedded processors expanding 
rapidly.163  For example, some newer automobiles include over one 
hundred processors performing a variety of functions, many of which 
were traditionally done with hardware.164  The consequence of this 
 161. Hardware and software, particularly in embedded application, are frequently 
interchangeable.  The identical function provided by software can be built directly into 
hardware in the form of custom ICs or programmable hardware devices like FPGAs, 
further blurring the boundaries.  The choice of whether to use hardware or software is 
often driven more by cost or functionality than any inherent distinction between hardware and 
software.  See generally Lara Simsic, Accelerating Algorithms in Hardware, EMBEDDED 
SYSTEMS PROGRAMMING, Feb. 2004, at 24. 
 162. While definitions may vary in technical details, the term “embedded systems” 
is widely used in the hardware and software development communities to refer to special 
purpose embedded processing systems that are typically comprised of a microcontroller 
or microprocessor, associated software (typically in the form of firmware), and analog 
and digital I/O.  See Definitions of Embedded System on the Web, Google, at 
http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&lr=&oi=defmore&q=define:EMBEDDED+SYSTEM 
(last visited Feb. 9, 2005) (linking to a variety of definitions, all including the basic 
elements of special purpose hardware, software, and I/O).  A number of software 
development publications focus on embedded software development.  One of the most 
popular is Embedded Systems Programming magazine and its associated website, located 
at http://www.embedded.com (last visited Feb. 9, 2005).  Other popular publications 
covering embedded systems design and development include EDN magazine, located at 
http://www.edn.com (last visited Feb. 9, 2005), and Embedded Computing Design, 
located at http://www.embedded-computing.com (last visited Feb. 9, 2005). 
 163. Processors are being incorporated in a hidden fashion into a huge array of 
devices.  Examples range from consumer products like toys, watches, calculators, 
televisions, and audio equipment to less conventional applications like toasters, 
refrigerators, and even clothing.  Most products that have some type of built-in 
intelligence implement it with embedded processors and their associated software.  See 
infra notes 164–65 for some examples.  In the interest of full disclosure it should be 
noted that, prior to attending law school, the author, an electrical engineer, worked 
extensively with embedded processor technology, designing and developing a number of 
embedded systems products, several of which are covered by U.S. patents.  See, e.g., 
U.S. Patent No. 6,609,431 (issued Aug. 26, 2003); U.S. Patent No. 5,999,889 (issued 
Dec. 7, 1999); U.S. Patent No. 5,233,537 (issued Aug. 3, 1993). 
 164. A Princeton University electrical engineering professor references these 
prolific uses in an online presentation. See Wayne Wolf, Computers as Components, at 
http://www.ee.Princeton.edu/~wolf/EE464/Overheads/ch1-1.ppt (2000).  In 1970, a 
typical car had about $75 in electronics, mostly in the form of the radio.  Today, the 
average car has $2000 worth of microprocessors and related hardware, controlling 
everything from the brakes to the power windows.  On some luxury cars the total 
processor cost can approach $10,000.  These systems improve almost every aspect of a 




growth of embedded systems is that software is increasingly used to 
replace mechanical and electronic functions previously implemented in 
hardware as well as to implement new, previously impractical functions.  
It would be unrealistic to claim that a particular system would contain 
protectable components if they were in a mechanical or electronic form 
but not if they were software-based.165
Software can also be readily incorporated into a product as part of a 
standard manufacturing process.  In this context, software programs are 
treated as merely another part of the assembly process.  As an example, 
software for an embedded processor installed on a product’s circuit 
board might be transmitted by a programmer in disk form, CD form, or 
via the Internet to a manufacturing facility.  The production line would 
then assemble the electronics and mechanical housing.  The software 
would then be loaded, via a production line device programmer, into the 
microcontroller.  This would normally be followed by a test stage and 
packaging, which completes the manufacturing process.  In this typical 
example, software is integrated—as a component of the completed 
product—in a way that is essentially indistinguishable from other 
elements of a device; this suggests that software should be treated the 
same as any other tangible, physical component. 
Despite the fact that software has generally become acceptable as 
patentable subject matter and software components can be closely 
analogized to similar mechanical or electronic ones, several arguments 
suggest that software should not be treated as a component under § 
271(f).  First, § 271(f) was enacted specifically in response to Deepsouth, 
which involved only manufacture, sale, and assembly of mechanical 
machine parts potentially infringing on an apparatus patent.166  This 
limitation was noted twelve years later, when § 271(f) was enacted, and 
the limited legislative history clearly states it was made in direct 
vehicle’s operations and have been particularly important in improving safety.  Paul A. 
Eisenstein, Silicon Chip Takes Over the Auto, DETROIT NEWS, at http://www.detnews. 
com/specialreports/2000/goldenage/silicon/silicon.htm (Jan. 10, 2000). 
 165. A good example of this is fly–by-wire systems in modern aircraft.  Flight 
control was traditionally maintained through control surfaces, such as rudders or 
ailerons, that were mechanically linked to the pilot’s control yolk.  Contemporary 
aircraft, including both passenger and high performance military jets, replace this 
mechanical and hydraulic linkage with fly-by-wire systems comprised of processing 
software at the flight yolk and control surface that performs the same functions provided 
by the mechanical linkage.  See, e.g., Airbus Media Centre, Our Advantages: Fly-by-
Wire, at http://www.airbus.com/media/fly_by.asp (2005) (explaining Airbus’s fly by 
wire system used on commercial jets).  Numerous other examples of this functional 
replacement role of software abound.  Moreover, it would not be surprising today to see 
some of the functions implemented by the shrimp deveining machinery in Deepsouth 
replaced or enhanced by processors and software. 
 166. Deepsouth Packing Co. v Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 519–23 (1972). 
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response to Deepsouth to deter manufacturers acting as copyists.167  A 
narrow reading of the statutory provision based on this legislative 
history might imply that liability should be limited to tangible, 
mechanical parts of machines such as the boxed parts of the shrimp 
processing machinery at issue in Deepsouth.  Several reported district 
court § 271(f) cases have raised similar arguments in the context of 
chemical exports.168  For example, in W.R. Grace & Co. v. Intercat, Inc., 
Intercat claimed that because the allegedly infringed patent and 
component was for a chemical composition, rather than a mechanical or 
structural apparatus, § 271(f) did not apply.169  This argument failed.  The 
court roundly rejected a mechanical-only interpretation, stating that 
“[n]owhere in the statute or its legislative history is there a limitation to 
components of machines and other structural combinations.”170  Therefore, 
refusal to apply the statute to a chemical composition patent, merely 
because the underlying chemical components are not mechanical parts, 
“would be tantamount to legislating additional language to a statute” that 
arbitrarily precludes some categories but not others.171  Extending 
protection beyond mechanical to chemical components, but not to 
software, would create an arbitrary, unsupported, and artificial limit. 
Microsoft has raised similar arguments in Eolas and Imagexpo that 
have, to date, proven similarly unsuccessful.  Microsoft argued that 
its exported software is “a template, similar to a design, instruction, 
or recipe.”172  Alternately, Microsoft claimed that the software was 
distinguishable from the chemicals in W.R. Grace because it is analogous to 
 167. See supra notes 119–24 and accompanying text. 
 168. See, e.g., W.R. Grace & Co. v. Intercat, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 2d 316, 320 (D. Del. 
1999); Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 696 F. Supp. 302, 312 (N.D. Ohio 1988).  These 
two cases were cited by the District Court’s memorandum opinion in Eolas as “[t]he 
closest cases” to the one at issue.  Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 274 F. Supp. 2d 
972, 973 (N.D. Ill. 2003). 
 169. W.R. Grace, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 320.  This argument rested on a narrow reading 
of § 271(f)’s legislative history.  Intercat argued that § 271(f)(2) did not apply because 
the legislative history “‘states that the statute only covers components of machines and 
other structural combinations, since the section was enacted specifically to overrule’ 
Deepsouth.”  Id. (quoting defendant Intercat’s pleadings). 
 170. Id. at 321.  The court in Lubrizol rejected a similar argument; however, it did 
not provide any analysis for its decision.  Lubrizol, 696 F. Supp. at 325 (enjoining supply 
of chemical components of a lubricating compound outside the United States under § 
271(f)). 
 171. W.R. Grace, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 321. 
 172. Imagexpo, L.L.C. v. Microsoft Corp., 299 F. Supp. 2d 550, 552 (E.D. Va. 
2003). 




the chemical formula rather than the chemical itself.173  Under this view, 
software is not a tangible, physical object and, therefore, cannot be 
included as a component in an apparatus or device.174  However, this 
argument again fails to recognize that software can be both conceptually 
and functionally more than merely a process or formula.  A particular 
instance of executable code, as stored in a product’s memory, can be 
considered a standalone entity,175 and its final result can be indistinguishable 
from a comparable mechanical or electronic component that would 
clearly enjoy protection.  A formula, on the other hand, merely provides 
instructions for creating the component, rather than implementing the 
functionality itself. 
Another potential argument against protection of software rests on the 
recent Federal Circuit decision in Bayer AG v. Housey Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc.,176 decided under 35 U.S.C. § 271(g), a statutory provision related to 
§ 271(f).  Housey involved a drug discovery research tool that was covered 
by a U.S. process patent.177  Under § 271(g), infringement occurs if the 
resulting product of the patented process is imported into the United 
States.178  The process at issue in Housey produced data assessing the 
efficacy of a chemical compound for pharmaceutical purposes, rather 
than a tangible item such as a chemical compound or drug.179  The 
Federal Circuit rejected protection for this data alone based primarily on 
its interpretation of what constitutes manufacturing for purposes of 
statutory interpretation.180
 173. Eolas, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 973–74. 
 174. Microsoft relies primarily on Enpat for this argument.  Imagexpo, 299 F. Supp. 
2d at 552.  However, Enpat specifically dealt with only a process or method patent with 
no component or apparatus claims, whereas the potential infringement here rests on 
construing the software as a part of a patented component invention.  Enpat, Inc. v. 
Microsoft Corp., 6 F. Supp. 2d 537, 539 (E.D. Va. 1998). 
 175. To paraphrase, when code gets loaded into a device, it exists uniquely in every 
instance of that device that is assembled or manufactured.  This distinguishes it from a 
formula or template which is typically limited in quantity to one or a few instances and 
exists outside the resultant product of the template or formula.  As the court in Imagexpo 
noted, in the manufacturing process, the software, in the form of executable code, 
“becomes an integral ingredient in the finished computer product.” Imagexpo, 299 F. 
Supp. 2d at 553. 
 176. 340 F.3d 1367 (Fed Cir. 2003). 
 177. Id. at 1369. 
 178. The language of § 271(g) states that “[w]hoever without authority imports into 
the United States . . . a product which is made by a process patented in the United States 
shall be liable as an infringer, if the importation . . . occurs during the term of such 
process patent.”  35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2000). 
 179. Housey, 340 F.3d at 1369, 1377.  The process at issue is a “method of 
determining whether a substance is an inhibitor or activator of a protein whose 
production by a cell evokes a responsive change in a phenotypic characteristic other than 
the level of said protein in said cell per se . . . .”  See claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 
4,980,281 (issued Dec. 25, 1990). 
 180. Housey, 340 F.3d at 1377. 
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The legislative histories of § 271(f) and § 271(g) are somewhat 
related.181  The Federal Circuit in Housey noted that even if the 
legislative history does not demonstrate a specific intent to limit the 
scope of coverage of § 271(g) (and possibly by analogy § 271(f)), 
nothing suggests “that Congress was concerned that the preexisting 
statutory scheme failed to reach intangible information, or that the 
substantive coverage of the Act, as opposed to the available remedies, 
was to be expanded.”182  This distinction rests on the court’s emphasis 
on extraterritorial manufacturing as a basis for enactment of § 271(g),183 
as well as its interpretation of what constituted manufacturing.  The 
Housey court construed manufacturing narrowly, limiting its results to 
“physical goods that were manufactured and does not include [intangible 
information, such as data,] generated by a patented process . . . .”184  
This suggests that the Federal Circuit might view components under § 
271(f) as limited to tangible items and, therefore, preclude protection for 
intangible elements of a combination invention, such as data or software 
components.  While this case is probably the closest the Federal Circuit 
has come to interpreting § 271(f) in the software context, it is still 
distinguishable on several points.  First, Housey deals with a separate 
statutory provision related to process, rather than apparatus, patents.  As 
at least one district court case has noted, § 271(f) does not apply to 
process patent claims.185  In addition, while the legislative histories of § 
271(f) and § 271(g) are somewhat related, they deal with distinct 
concerns and were ultimately enacted during different legislative 
sessions, with § 271(g) receiving much more elaborate legislative 
consideration based on a variety of policy concerns not implicated by § 
271(f).  Section 271(f)’s legislative history, on the other hand, suggests a 
 181. What eventually became § 271(g) was initially proposed in 1983 in both the 
House and Senate.  A subsequent bill in the following year again proposed a precursor of 
§ 271(g): “[i]f the patent invention is a process, whoever without authority uses or sells 
within, or imports into, the United States during the term of the patent therefor a product 
produced by such process infringes the patent.”  Id. at 1374 (quoting S. REP. NO. 98-663, 
at 30 (1984)). 
 182. Housey, 340 F.3d at 1374. 
 183. The court noted that “[e]ach and every reference to the provision that became 
section 271(g) describes it as directed to manufacturing.”  Id.  Moreover, the 
introductory language to the 1984 amendments specifically states that it is intended to 
“avoid encouraging manufacturing outside the United States.”  Patent Law Amendments 
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-622, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (89 Stat. 3383) 5827. 
 184. Housey, 340 F.3d at 1368. 
 185. Enpat, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 6 F. Supp. 2d 537, 539 (E.D. Va. 1998). 




very limited response to a single case, Deepsouth.  Finally, § 271(g) 
deals with the output product of a patent protected process, whereas          
§ 271(f) deals with the component inputs of a manufacturing process.186  
Consequently, the Housey Court’s narrow reading of the scope of 
protection under § 271(g) should not provide a strong inference that § 
271(f) should be similarly construed, or that it should preclude 
components such as software that can clearly be an input component to a 
manufacturing process. 
B.  The Scope of Protectable Components 
Assuming, as proposed, that software is considered a component 
under § 271(f), the next question is what constitutes protectable software 
for liability purposes under § 271(f).  Dictionary definitions of software 
are very broad, typically including “the entire set of programs, 
procedures, and related documentation associated with a . . . computer 
system.”187  Software has also been described as “what empowers a 
computer to handle information and to control information flow.”188  
These definitions provide a general, amorphous scope.  As a consequence, 
export of any of these forms of software could potentially impose 
liability. 
The key to assessing the scope of protectability under § 271(f) lies in 
examining its legislative purpose in light of the general scope of 
protection provided by patent law.  Protection should be narrowly 
construed under this analysis, in light of the limited purpose behind § 
271(f), to reach only components used as part of a manufacturing 
process or its equivalent.  This limitation can be justified for at least two 
reasons.  First, as discussed previously, § 271(f) was enacted in direct 
response to a perceived patent protection problem associated with the 
manufacturing process.189  The legislative history clearly indicates that 
 186. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)–(g) (2000). 
 187. WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1120 (9th ed. 1989).  One 
commentator recently summarized various reference definitions including:   
computer programs and applications . . . that can be run on a particular 
computer system . . .[,] something used or associated with, and usually contrasted 
with hardware . . .[, t]he programs, routines, and symbolic languages that control 
the functioning of the hardware and direct its operation . . .[,] the instructions 
which control what a computer does . . .[, and] the instructions that control 
what a computer can do.   
GREGORY A. STOBBS, SOFTWARE PATENTS: 2004 CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT 9–10 (2004).  
From these definitions, “it is clear that the term ‘software’ means many things to many 
people.”  Id. at 10. 
 188. STOBBS, supra note 29, at 49. 
 189. See supra notes 118–23 and accompanying text. 
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the scope should be limited to this specific situation.190  A second 
justification for a narrow interpretation lies in the general purposes and 
limitation of patent protection.  As a rule, patent protection is limited in 
claim scope as well as territorially.191  Section 271(f) liability is counter 
to these fundamental patent limitations because it extends liability to 
extraterritorial acts and unassembled invention components that do not 
infringe a patent’s claims.  Therefore, § 271(f) constitutes a narrowly 
limited exception to these general rules and should be construed 
accordingly.192
i.  Source versus Executable Code Forms 
Construing software narrowly under this approach, the question of 
scope of protection then becomes one of determining what forms of 
software are usable as components in a manufacturing process.  While 
software definitions are broad, they can be divided into two distinct 
categories: source code and executable code.193  While liability could 
conceivably be imposed for export of component forms falling within 
either of these categories, protection under § 271(f) should be limited to 
software in the executable form.  This limitation is appropriate because 
 190. While limited, the legislative history states that “[t]his proposal responds to the 
United States Supreme Court decision in Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp.,” 
which dealt with the narrow issue of protectability of unassembled components in a 
manufacturing situation.  Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-622, 
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (89 Stat. 3383) 5827, 5828.  The legislative history also states that § 
271(f) was enacted to “prevent copiers from avoiding U.S. patents by supplying 
components . . . so that the assembly of the components may be completed abroad.”  Id.  
This strongly implies a manufacturing only context. 
 191. See supra notes 32–36 and accompanying text. 
 192. A general rule of statutory interpretation is that a narrow, specific statutory 
enactment prevails over a more general one when they are in conflict.  See, e.g., Missouri 
v. Ross, 299 U.S. 72, 76 (1936) (specific statute prevails over general, citing additional 
authority). 
 193. One noted computer science scholar discussed software in these two forms: 
[P]rograms have two different sorts of manifestations.  On the one hand, they 
are documents of some kind that give a series of instructions [—such as source 
code and associated instructions, etc.—] to be executed by a computer.  But 
these passive documents can be turned into active physical processes: when a 
program is executed, the instructions in the document are carried out. . . .  Does 
“program” [or software] refer to the passive text, or the active event? 
GELERNTER & JAGANNATHAN, supra note 61, at 1–2.  The documents are representative 
of what is known as source code, the textual description of what the computer hardware 
is to perform.  The actual program execution is carried out by executable code, which 
can be represented in a textual form but directly represents what operations are being 
executed on the hardware itself in the exact form used by a processor. 




only this form can be directly incorporated into a product as part of a 
manufacturing, rather than design or development, process.194
Source code is the textual description of a computer program’s 
operation, typically written in a standardized computer language such as 
C or C++.195  A programmer creates software by converting general 
functional requirements—as embodied in software specifications, design 
documents, flowcharts, and other high level planning tools—into one or 
more source code text files or modules.196  Software development is 
typically an interactive process where source code is converted to object 
code197 via a compiler, and then linked with other object code modules 
into executable code. 
Some arguments suggest source code might be considered a component 
for § 271(f) liability purposes.  The source code represents the underlying 
ideas implemented by the resulting executable code.  As a consequence, 
it includes all the algorithms, procedures, functions, and features in the 
resulting object code and executable program.198  Therefore, it represents 
the final desired result and is used to directly create the final executable 
code.  Specific source code is frequently incorporated into patent 
applications as a represented best mode embodiment of the invention.199  
In addition, there is a very close relationship between source code and 
 194. The critical distinction here is between design and manufacturing.  Design is 
defined as “to conceive and plan out in the mind,” or “to devise for a specific function or 
end.”  WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 343 (9th ed. 1989).  Nothing in § 
271(f)’s legislative history or language suggests that the scope should reach beyond the 
assembly stage to the mental process of design or its byproducts.  Attempts to extend § 
271(f) protection beyond the manufacturing context are beyond the case law and 
legislative history motivating § 271(f). 
 195. Source code can include multiple text files, including program functions, 
macros, and compiler instructions that direct how the separate files are combined to 
create binary of executable code.  Source code is human readable following a precisely 
defined language syntax that is “readily understood by skilled programmers.”  
Conversely, computers cannot understand source code, which is “incomprehensible to a 
computer.”  ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW 
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 539, 541 (2002). 
 196. For a concise summary of common software development processes, see id. at 
531–39. 
 197. Object code is an intermediate software form, closer in nature to executable 
code than source code.  An object code module contains the translated source code, but 
is in a form that may not be directly executable because it is typically missing address 
information that is added during a later process known as linking.  See Byte Craft 
Limited, Glossary of Embedded Systems Terminology, at http://www.bytecraft.com/ 
embeddedglossarysection.html (2005) (defining object code). 
 198. This degree of specificity would normally be sufficient to grant patent rights 
over any implementation of the described functionality.  See STOBBS, supra note 29, at 
277–89. 
 199. An additional requirement for patentability is disclosure of a best mode, or the 
best way known to the inventor for making the invention at the time of application.  35 
U.S.C. § 112 (2000); see also STOBBS, supra note 29, at 265–66, 277–80. 
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the final executable code.200  As part of the code compilation process, a 
complete source code package can be converted by anyone cognizant in 
using programming tools into the associated object code with minimal 
effort.201
As an example, suppose a programmer creates software to implement 
one claimed function of a patented device for the international market 
knowing that it would constitute direct infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 
271(a) if made, used, or sold in the United States.202  This scenario could 
implicate § 271(f) liability; however, the programmer could test the 
software in a way that would avoid direct infringement,203 verify that it 
operated adequately, then email the source code files to another 
programmer outside the United States—where it could be readily 
recompiled into the downloadable executable code.  But should source 
code be considered a component in this scenario and impose liability?204
Consider, instead, a variation on this hypothetical.  Suppose, in the 
example above, that instead of sending the source code abroad, she 
 200. The source code files are translated into the processor specific instructions via 
the linker and compiler.  Once configured, this translation process can appear to be 
entirely automated.  It does, nevertheless, require detailed configuration of the compiler 
and linker to create the final result.  As a consequence, this distinction should place 
source code on the design side of the design or manufacture boundary. 
 201. The extent of effort required depends on how many files are included in the 
source code project and what specific compiler and linker directives need to be set to 
complete the build of the final executable code.  In some cases, a programmer would 
need to set many output specific parameters; in other cases, he might only need to 
configure the compiler with the appropriate file names and directories.  All of these 
steps, however, involve some degree of design in configuration of the compiler and 
linker.  Therefore, they should be considered a design, rather than manufacturing, effort 
and, consequently, any input to the compiler should not be considered a component 
because it cannot be used directly in a manufacturing process. 
 202. Domestic liability could be imposed for any of these activities.  See 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(a) (2000). 
 203. Direct infringement could be avoided as long as she does not assemble all the 
claimed elements of the protected invention.  See supra notes 90–96 and accompanying 
text.  Testing of individual components or subassemblies could avoid infringement in 
this way.  Moreover, the prototype assembly could be designed around a valid patent by 
using common patent prosecution techniques.  Courses teaching these techniques are 
offered by several patent practitioners.  See, e.g., Patent Resources Group, Inc., 
“Designing Around” Valid U.S. Patents, at http://www.patentresources.com/ 
advancedl04/adv_design.html (2004). 
 204. Under the proposed limitation excluding source code from protection, no 
liability would be incurred in this case under § 271(f) because the recipient would still 
need to complete the design process by invoking the compiler to generate executable 
code.  What is exported is not a protectable manufacturing component, but rather 
precursor elements of the design process. 




merely compiles it into its final executable form.  This action itself, if 
done carefully, might not impose direct or indirect infringement liability.205  
But suppose that the programmer now emails the executable file to an 
overseas manufacturer for integration into an otherwise legal product.  Is 
this example distinct from the previous one, and should it result in 
liability under § 271(f)?206
Several distinctions between these two scenarios suggest that the 
source code should not enjoy protection whereas the executable code 
should.  First, the source code can be more closely analogized to a 
formula for the executable component rather than the component itself.  
As a formula, the source code would not enjoy protection under § 
271(f).207  Following this analogy, one commentator describes source 
code merely as a “detailed blueprint” for assembling the program’s 
building blocks, the machine instructions, into the final executable 
code.208  Second, the source code is unable to be directly integrated into 
a product without external transformation through human interaction 
with software development tools, including a compiler and linker.209  
This process makes a fundamental transformation of the source code, 
converting it from a form merely representative of the desired 
functionality to a completely different form that is incorporated directly 
into the invention to implement that functionality.  These processes 
should therefore be viewed as a hard boundary between the design and 
development process and the manufacturing process.  The programmer’s 
work up to generation of the final output, in the form of executable code, 
is a design, rather than manufacturing effort.  Because § 271(f) was 
enacted to counter a manufacturing, rather than design problem, it 
should be limited accordingly. 
Executable code, on the other hand, represents the final embodiment 
 205. As the Court in Deepsouth noted, “[n]o wrong is done the patentee until the 
combination is formed. . . .  [The] monopoly does not cover the manufacture or sale of 
separate elements capable of being, but never actually, associated to form the invention.”  
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 529 (1972).  Therefore, testing 
alone would not impose liability unless all the components were combined in a way to 
include all the claimed elements.  If the patented invention includes mechanical 
components, merely simulating them in software might not constitute assembly.  
Moreover, there would be no potential indirect liability absent a direct infringement. 
 206. In this case, the executable code should enjoy protection because it is in a final 
form and can be readily integrated into a manufactured product without any further 
changes. 
 207. Of the relatively few cases addressing § 271(f), they do seem to share the view 
that formulas and their equivalent do not enjoy protection.  For example, in the chemical 
context, see W.R. Grace & Co. v. Intercat, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 2d 316, 319–21 (D. Del. 
1999). 
 208. STOBBS, supra note 29, at 278–81. 
 209. While the effort required to configure a compiler and linker may be minimal, it 
still involves some degree of creative input to generate the final executable code. 
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of the software design and development process.  It can be directly 
loaded into a device’s memory, whether it be flash memory on a 
processor, a separate memory chip, or a hard drive.210  Software in 
executable form is processor specific and constitutes the instructions 
exactly as used during program execution.211  Manufacture of embedded 
products typically includes a step where the executable code is loaded, 
on a device-by-device basis, into the appropriate memory.  This process 
is conceptually very similar to putting mechanical components together.  
The mere fact that the assembled element is in the form of software, as 
opposed to hardware, should make no difference in a liability 
assessment.212
ii.  Process versus Apparatus Claim Distinctions 
In addition to limitations based on the form of software alleged to be 
infringing, § 271(f) implies that liability be conditioned on the form of 
the underlying patent as defined by the claims.  Under this analysis, 
patents protected by apparatus claims should enjoy § 271(f) protection 
whereas process-only patents should not. 
As noted previously, § 271(f)’s legislative history suggests it was a 
 210. These examples represent typical means of storing executable code into a 
device.  Most embedded devices with processors use microcontrollers which include 
onboard memory in the form of flash or EPROM.  See generally MYKE PREDKO, 
PROGRAMMING AND CUSTOMIZING THE 8051 MICROCONTROLLER 2–34 (1999). 
 211. See Wikipedia, Executable, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executable (last 
modified Dec. 26, 2004) (defining executable code forms). 
 212. As a practical matter, exclusion of software as a protectable component could, 
in effect, serve to remove all protection from devices that use software, at least under § 
271(f)(1).  Under § 271(f)(1), liability is precluded unless all or substantially all of the 
components are exported.  If software provides any significant functionality, liability 
would not lie under § 271(f) for export of hardware only because it would probably not 
be considered substantially all of the components.  One recent case addressed this 
concern in finding that omission of any significant hardware component would preclude 
liability.  See Fieldturf, Inc., v. Southwest Recreational Indus., Inc., 235 F. Supp. 2d 708, 
733 (E.D. Ky. 2002), vacated in part on other grounds, 357 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2004).  
Fieldturf involved export of one out of four components of an artificial turf product.  The 
court referenced the plural language of § 271(f)(1) noting that “[t]he language of § 
271(f)(1) speaks in terms of ‘components’ (plural) that are combined or are to be 
combined as opposed to . . . § 271(f)(2) which imposes liability in connection with . . . 
[supply] of a singular component.”  Id.  Conversely, “exporting a single component . . . 
of a patented invention abroad will not rise to the level of providing ‘a substantial 
portion of the patented invention.’”  Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) (2000)).  Hence, 
under § 271(f)(1), export of just the software element, even if it provides key 
functionality to the device, would not impose liability. 




narrowly tailored response to Deepsouth, which involved a combination 
or apparatus patent as distinguished from a process or method patent.213  
This distinction is critical in assessing the scope of protection.  Product 
claims are specifically defined in terms of their elements or 
components,214 whereas process claims merely involve a “series of acts 
performed in order to produce a given result.”215  As a consequence, 
process claims do not have components in a § 271(f) sense.216  This 
distinction was first suggested by the Federal Circuit in a 1991 case that 
involved export sales of a machine for making asphalt, Standard Havens 
Products, Inc. v. Gencor Industries, Inc.217 In Standard Havens, the 
process for making asphalt was claimed, but the patent did not include 
apparatus claims.218  Without any significant analysis, the Federal 
Circuit dismissed potential § 271(f) liability.219
The same issue was raised in the only significant previously reported § 
271(f) case involving software, Enpat, Inc., v. Microsoft Corp.220  In 
 213. The Supreme Court in Deepsouth repeatedly emphasized the composite nature 
of the shrimp peeling apparatus and exempted export liability because an apparatus 
invention could not be literally infringed unless it was either made, in complete form, or 
used within the United States.  See supra notes 99–118 and accompanying text. 
 214. When a claim is drafted in product or apparatus form “it is defined in terms of 
its structural elements.”  SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 24, at 293. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Another form of patents is design patents.  These patents are more like 
copyrights in that they protect “any new, original and ornamental design for an article of 
manufacture . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2000).  As such, they are merely “ornamental in 
character.  If the design is dictated by the performance of the article, then it is judged 
‘primarily functional’ and ineligible for design patent protection.”  SCHECHTER & 
THOMAS, supra note 24, at 310.  While design patents do not typically implicate software 
elements because they exclude functionality, at least one court has rejected any § 271(f) 
protection for design patents because they have no component parts to assemble.  See 
Aerogroup Int’l, Inc. v. Marlboro Footworks, Ltd., 955 F. Supp. 220, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 
1997). 
 217. 953 F.2d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1991), rev’d on other grounds, 1993 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 11963 (Fed. Cir. May 21, 1993). 
 218. Id. at 1374. 
 219. The court first analyzed direct and contributory infringement liability.  Process 
claims require actual use of the product to impose liability.  Because the machine was 
not actually used within the United States, there was no direct infringement.  Moreover, 
lack of apparatus claims precluded contributory infringement because contributory 
infringement is conditioned on a direct infringement.  The court then dismissed potential 
§ 271(f) claims by merely stating: “Finally, we do not find the provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 
271(f) (1988) implicated.”  Id. 
 220. 6 F. Supp. 2d 537 (E.D. Va. 1998).  One other recent Federal Circuit case 
involved software in this context but no issues concerning § 271(f) liability were 
considered because they were not timely addressed at the district court level.  See 
Southwest Software, Inc. v. Harlequin Inc., 226 F.3d 1280, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2000).  
Southwest Software provided the Federal Circuit the opportunity to affirm Enpat’s 
process claim distinction; however, the court declined to comment, noting only that the 
“argument[s] concerning the application of § 271[(f)] to method claims [were] raised for 
the first time on appeal; for that reason, we will not consider [them].”  Id. 
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Enpat, Microsoft was accused of infringing a process software patent.  
The court rejected application of § 271(f) on two grounds.  First, it relied 
on Deepsouth’s apparatus components as a limit on scope of protectability.221  
It then cited Standard Havens as rejection of process protection under         
§ 271(f).222
As a consequence, Enpat has significant implications for software 
patent protection.  Because software has traditionally been claimed in 
process form, many of the earlier software patents will not enjoy protection 
against § 271(f) infringement.  Recent trends towards protecting software 
more broadly with both process and apparatus claims should, however, 
expand protectability under § 271(f) as apparatus claims for software 
increase.  Therefore, inventors seeking protection against potential § 
271(f) infringement should claim any pure software inventions, as well 
as hybrid hardware and software inventions, in both process and 
apparatus form.  Any analysis of potential § 271(f) liability should 
carefully consider what form the allegedly infringed invention is 
claimed.  If it is claimed in process form only, § 271(f) should not apply. 
C.  Software Component Export Problems 
In addition to the substantive component requirements, § 271(f) 
includes an export element requiring that the component or components 
be supplied or caused to be supplied from the United States.223  The 
language used in §§ 271(f)(1) and 271(f)(2) is identical,224 suggesting 
that the nature of supplying, unlike what constitutes a component for 
liability purposes,225 is the same under both subsections.  In many cases, 
the means of supply will be similar to Deepsouth, where a component or 
series of components are physically transported out of the country.226  
 221. The court emphasized the fact that Deepsouth involved machine components 
protected as part of a product, rather than process, patent.  Enpat, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 538. 
 222. Id. (citing Standard Havens, 953 F.2d at 1374). 
 223. 35 § U.S.C. § 271(f) (2000). 
 224. Both subsections state that “[w]hoever without authority supplies or causes to 
be supplied in or from the United States” is liable for infringement.  Id. 
 225. The component distinction rests on the difference between induced and 
contributory infringement.  Section 271(f)(1) imposes liability for components in any 
form, as long as they make up all or most of the invention.  Section 271(f)(2), however, 
requires the component to be specifically made for the infringing use and have no other 
substantial commercial purpose.  See 35 U.S.C. § 271(f). 
 226. For example, in Deepsouth the mechanical parts were presumably merely 
boxed unassembled in the United States and then shipped to a Brazilian customer for 
final assembly.  Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 523 n.5 (1972). 




While it has yet to be addressed in the case law, the intangible nature of 
software raises conceptual concerns regarding what other activities 
constitute export for liability purposes.  These concerns can be grouped 
into two general categories: first, what channels of export constitute a 
“supply” of the component; and second, what quantity of software is 
actually exported.  This Comment proposes that the channel of export 
should be irrelevant as long as it is nontransformative of the software 
itself, resulting in a received version identical to the original.  The actual 
quantity exported, however, is critical to the analysis.  Unlike Eolas and 
Imagexpo, where unlimited liability was imposed for export of a single 
master unit, liability under § 271(f) should be limited on a one-to-one 
basis with the quantity exported.227
i.  Channels of Component Supply 
The traditional mode of component export, as exemplified by 
Deepsouth, involved merely shipping a tangible, physical component by 
a standard means of transport such as by plane, truck, or ship.  This basic 
mode of export can be used equally well in some cases of software 
export.  For example, software in final executable form loaded onto 
hardware devices, such as code burned onto hardware, such as an 
EPROM, flash, or a programmable logic device such as an FPGA,228 
could be physically exported in a tangible form by any standard means 
of transport.229  Moreover, code stored in an intermediate state that is not 
directly executable, such as on a hard disk,230 could also be readily 
 227. This limitation relates directly to Eolas, where liability was imposed for 
multiple instances of the software even though a single, or limited number of golden 
masters was shipped abroad.  See Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 274 F. Supp. 2d 
972, 974 (N.D. Ill. 2003). 
 228. EPROM is an acronym for erasable programmable read only memory, which is 
memory that can be erased and rewritten.  Flash memory is similar to EPROM but 
allows for rapid reprogramming of specific memory addresses.  An FPGA is a field 
programmable gate array, another type of programmable hardware device that more 
closely resembles a matrix of digital logic circuits.  These devices are just a sample of 
popular programmable hardware devices that can store code in its final executable form.  
See KEN ARNOLD, EMBEDDED CONTROLLER HARDWARE DESIGN 95–115 (2001) 
(explaining memory technology including EPROMs); Webopedia Computer Dictionary, 
FPGA, at http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/F/FPGA.html (last modified May 13, 
2003) (explaining FPGAs). 
 229. This mode of export also raises questions regarding whether what is exported 
constitutes a single component, potentially avoiding liability under § 271(f) as 
exemplified in Fieldturf, or whether the software burned on the device and the device 
itself constitute separate components, thereby potentially creating liability under both § 
271(f)(1) and § 271(f)(2).  For purposes of this discussion it is assumed that 
combinations of hardware and software like this constitute a single component. 
 230. The hard disk example is conceptually different from programmable hardware 
because code is not executed directly from a hard disk but rather is transferred to a 
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exported in this fashion, creating potential § 271(f)(1) or § 271(f)(2) 
liability.231
A more difficult question arises, however, when the nonphysical 
nature of software, and the associated nontangible means of distribution, 
are considered.  As an example, consider the fact that software in the 
form of executable code is just a series of numbers, typically represented 
in binary form or a more compact equivalent.232  Any executable code 
can therefore be written as that sequence of numbers.  Suppose that a 
piece of executable code that would constitute a component under § 
271(f) was stored on an EPROM device as discussed above.  If the 
EPROM code was then read out, it could be written on a sheet of paper 
as a series of numbers.  If the EPROM was then exported either alone or 
as part of a kit or combination,233 it would intuitively constitute supply 
under § 271(f) as discussed above.  Suppose instead that the programmer 
merely called a colleague outside the United States and read the numbers 
off the paper over the telephone.  Does this constitute supply under § 
271(f)?  It appears that the same ultimate result would occur, assuming 
the code could be reloaded into an EPROM or similar device overseas 
and then assembled into a patented invention.234  Nevertheless, there are 
hardware memory device, typically DRAM but also SRAM or even flash and then 
executed.  Nevertheless, assuming software stored on a hard disk is a component for 
liability purposes, liability should be the same. 
 231. For example, imagine a kit consisting of a package of parts.  The kit, when 
assembled, is a device consisting of a product housing, electronic and digital hardware, 
and associated software stored in hardware or on a hard disk.  Suppose the kit is boxed 
and shipped via truck to Mexico for assembly.  This would be a straightforward case of 
infringement under § 271(f) and a close analogy to Deepsouth. 
 232. Binary numbers are merely numbers using a base of two rather than ten as we 
ordinarily use.  Binary numbers can be written as a series of zeros or ones.  This 
becomes cumbersome, however, because the number of digits can quickly become large.  
Therefore, more compressed number bases, such as hexadecimal, are frequently used to 
more compactly represent binary numbers.  See University of Calgary–Computer 
Science, The Hexadecimal Number Base System, at http://pages.cpsc.ucalgary.ca/ 
~becker/231/Notes/Binary/ExtraNotes/hex.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2004) (explaining 
hexadecimal numbers and conversion from decimal and binary). 
 233. Export of the EPROM alone should only impose liability under § 271(f)(2) 
assuming it satisfies the other requirements.  Export of a kit or combination including the 
EPROM could impose liability under either § 271(f)(1) or § 271(f)(2) if there is more 
than one component, or if the EPROM and associated code were specially made for the 
infringing product with knowledge that it would infringe. 
 234. The code in this example could be readily reloaded onto an EPROM or similar 
device by merely converting it back to an ASCII hex file or similar format and then 
loading it with a standard device programmer.  See generally PREDKO, supra note 210, at 
179–99 (describing the process of programming devices from hex (text-based) files). 




several conceptual distinctions in this example.  First, the software does 
not remain in its final form, but rather is transformed repeatedly through 
the supply process.  Second, it lacks any of the physical characteristics 
of components like chemicals or machine parts as discussed previously.  
Therefore, the analogy to merely boxing and shipping component parts 
as in Deepsouth, where the components are subsequently assembled 
unmodified into a final product, fails here.235
Although this hypothetical means of distribution by phone is completely 
impractical for any significant piece of software, it demonstrates the 
possibilities raised by modern means of software distribution, particularly 
via the Internet.  It is common to transfer software via the Internet either 
by FTP, email, or web download.  A programmer might, for example, 
develop and test a piece of code for incorporation into a product using 
embedded hardware and software that is being manufactured in Mexico.  
Once the code is complete, he emails it to the manufacturer for 
download into a microcontroller on the product’s circuit board during 
the assembly process.  In sending the software, the code is likely 
transformed repeatedly.  First, he may zip or compress the code to 
minimize transfer and download time.236  At this point, the code is not 
only transformed from its executable form, but is also completely 
unrecognizable and nonfunctional as executable code; it no longer 
represents an executable program.237  Next, the file might undergo 
numerous other transformations, such as ASCII conversion where the 
binary data is converted into text and packetized238 for transmission and 
 235. There is also a conceptual distinction with the chemical cases, where the 
chemicals were combined or modified as part of the manufacturing process, thereby 
transforming them.  They were not, however, transformed domestically or during 
shipment, only as part of the manufacturing process.  See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Intercat, 
Inc., 60 F. Supp. 2d 316, 319–21 (D. Del. 1999) 
 236. Compression is commonly used to minimize file size and transmission time as 
well as decrease the likelihood of file error or retransmission when an in-process transfer 
is interrupted.  This process consists of removing redundancy from the series of numbers 
comprising the executable code.  For more information on zip files and file compression, 
see Brock Wood, All About .ZIP Files, at http://www.eurekais.com/brock/aazip.htm (last 
updated Nov. 23, 2001). 
 237. Although it no longer represents the original file or program, it is still related 
to the original program by a series of mathematical steps constituting the encryption and 
decryption algorithms.  These steps, however, can lead to a relatively high degree of 
differentiation between the original and resulting compressed file.  Using these 
algorithms, compression on the order of seventy to eighty-five percent is not uncommon.  
For a summary of maximum loss free compression ratios for common data and 
executable (program) files, see Maximum Compression, Lossless Data Compression 
Software Benchmarks/Comparisons, at http://www.maximumcompression.com (2005). 
 238. As an example, binary files are sometimes converted to ASCII text for 
transmission via email programs.  This process is used by some email transfer programs, 
such as UUENCODE and UUDECODE to transfer binary data.  See Glossary: 
UUencode/UUdecode, at http://www.learnthenet.com/english/glossary/uuencode.htm 
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later reassembly.239  As a consequence, the code may be morphed 
repeatedly into forms bearing no resemblance to the original executable 
code. 
Despite these distinctions from mere shipment of mechanical parts 
that remain physically unmodified, the original code will  ultimately be 
reconstructed exactly as it started the process.  This will occur in most, 
but not all cases.240  Assuming complete reconstruction, the mere fact 
that the software component is transformed in the process should not be 
relevant when the resulting code is identical to the transmitted code.241  
Any other interpretation would necessarily disregard the intrinsic 
transformable properties of digital data.  Ultimately, the primary concern 
is whether what is received is the same as what is transmitted.  If the two 
are identical, then the transport means should not matter, even if the 
code is radically transformed in the export process. 
ii.  Quantitative Concerns 
A second, and perhaps more important issue raised in the software 
export context concerns the quantity of software actually exported.  
Recall the EPROM example from the previous section.  Assuming 
liability could be imposed under § 271(f) for exporting these EPROMs, 
this suggests that liability should be imposed for each article of software 
(last visited Feb. 9, 2005) (explaining UUENCODE). 
 239. This packetization, using the TCP/IP protocol, is a core element of Internet 
operation.  For a concise summary see G. PETER ALBERT, JR. & LAFF, WHITESEL & 
SARET, LTD., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CYBERSPACE 14–18 (1999). 
 240. Some compression schemes regenerate the original content exactly and are 
known as lossless.  Other schemes, such as JPEG, which is commonly used for image 
compression, and MP3, for sound compression use, lossy compression which actually 
transforms the original file to maximize compression.  These lossy schemes are not 
appropriate for software in the form of executable code; however, they might be used in 
some cases for software components such as images.  Executable code must use a 
lossless scheme and, therefore, the resulting uncompressed file should be an exact 
duplicate of the original.  For an overview of lossy compression as implemented by the 
JPEG algorithm, see Gordon Richardson, Jpeg Compression Introduction, at 
http://www.photo.net/learn/jpeg (2003). 
 241. This view replaces the supply or transmission process with a black box.  
Rather than consider whether the same component is physically moved from one place to 
another, the black box approach looks at the component going in and coming out.  If 
mechanical parts like cases, nuts, bolts, and other hardware coming out of the boxes at 
the manufacturer are the same as those going in the boxes at the start of shipment, then 
what happens en route is irrelevant.  Likewise, if the code going into the supply system is 
identical coming out, then the fact that the process transforms it in some way, even a 
completely radical way, is irrelevant under this analysis. 




exported, with a one-to-one relationship between the export and resulting 
products.  For example, suppose the EPROM is incorporated into a lawn 
mower or other motorized product (the EPROM might, for example, 
control engine operation or emissions), that would infringe a U.S. patent 
if manufactured domestically.242  Each EPROM device exported should 
result in liability for one instance of infringement, with the associated 
liability for lost profits or reasonable royalty as statutorily allowed.243  If 
100,000 EPROMS and the associated code were exported, liability 
would be imposed for 100,000 infringing articles.244  There is a problem 
with this analysis in the case of software, however, that has yet to be 
addressed in the case law under § 271(f). 
While liability for export of software based on the number of units 
exported seems straightforward, under the recent Microsoft cases, 
liability for large numbers of infringing devices may be imposed for 
export of a single copy of the software.245  For example, suppose Microsoft 
exports 100,000 copies of Windows that are then subsequently installed 
on computers in Mexico and sold internationally.  As in the EPROM 
example above, this should result in liability for 100,000 units.  If 
instead Microsoft exports a single “golden master” copy of Windows, as 
in Eolas and Imagexpo, and then installs the software repeatedly onto 
100,000 units, should this action result in similar liability?  Intuition and 
§ 271(f) statutory history suggests it should not.  As previously noted, § 
271(f) was enacted as a limitation on manufacturing activities and has 
been narrowly construed within that context.  When a single master copy 
of the software is exported, it represents merely that, a single unit.  If 
that unit is loaded repeatedly into multiple devices abroad, those 
multiple units are created overseas at the time of manufacture, not in the 
 242. For this example, assume the product would infringe one or more U.S. patents 
if made or used domestically.  This requires that the product contain all the claimed 
elements of the patents, as discussed previously, thereby satisfying the requirements of § 
271(f)(1) or § 271(f)(2). 
 243. 35 U.S.C. §§ 283–84 (2000).  Microsoft’s liability in Eolas was assessed in 
this way.  The jury multiplied a value of $1.47 per infringing copy times 354 million 
copies sold to arrive at total damages of $521 million.  Cherry, supra note 9, at 47. 
 244. Under the statutory liability requirements, the patent holder could recover the 
actual value of lost profits from those 100,000 unit sales depending on certain factors.  
See, e.g., Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1154–58 (6th 
Cir. 1978).  Alternately, if there is an insufficient showing of the patent holder’s ability 
to satisfy the market demand or market uncertainty, she might only be entitled to a 
reasonable royalty, on a per unit basis, based on the actual number of units sold.  Id.  In 
either case, liability would be assessed based on the quantity of infringing products 
produced. 
 245. For example, in Eolas, the jury imposed liability on a per unit basis for all 
sales of Microsoft Windows overseas, despite the fact that multiple instances of 
Windows were installed from a single “golden master.”  Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft 
Corp., 274 F. Supp. 2d 972, 973–74 (N.D. Ill. 2003). 
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United States.  As a result, there should be no liability because those 
copies are not actually supplied from the United States, but are created 
abroad at the time the source code is loaded into the device.  Since each 
instance is actually created outside the United States at the time of 
manufacture, no liability should be imposed.246  The alternate view of 
liability, as embraced by Eolas, can create a paradoxical anomaly with 
Waymark, imposing indeterminate liability when the components are not 
actually assembled abroad.247  Because of these concerns, export liability 
under § 271(f) should be limited to the actual quantity of software units 
exported, not the number of instances created extraterritorially. 
D.  Policy Considerations 
This Comment suggests that § 271(f) be construed narrowly to limit 
liability for software component export.  Under this view, software 
should enjoy some degree of protection under § 271(f) because it is 
patentable subject matter and can functionally replicate analogous 
mechanical component functions.  Moreover, software is being increasingly 
incorporated into all variety of products, not just traditional mainframe 
or desktop PC applications.  As the embedded product market continues 
to expand, software will become more and more pervasive, and its role 
in replacing physical parts that clearly receive protection under § 271(f) 
 246. While components manufactured domestically, then exported, can impose § 
271(f) liability, the Federal Circuit has rejected extension to components made outside 
the United States.  See Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1257–58 
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (rejecting liability for components manufactured outside the United 
States); Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc., No. 02-11562-RWZ, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
7598, at *1–2 (D. Mass. May 7, 2003) (rejecting liability for integrated circuit chips built 
entirely outside the United States), aff’d, 375 F.3d 1113 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 247. Waymark imposes liability for mere shipment of the component, even if no 
assembly is completed.  See Waymark Corp. v. Porta Sys. Corp., 245 F.3d 1364, 1368 
(Fed. Cir. 2001).  If, however, only a single master copy of software is exported, as in 
Eolas and Imagexpo, how can liability be assessed if the “golden master” is never 
actually used to manufacture anything?  Waymark holds that liability is imposed as long 
as extraterritorial assembly was intended, but how should it be quantitatively assessed?  
Should it be based on the quantity the exporter thought would be made, or on what the 
manufacturer actually intended to make, or on some other measure?  This argument can 
apply to other permutations as well, such as when the golden master is used to create 
more copies than initially authorized.  Does this limit liability to the quantity intended to 
be created by the exporter or is the quantity limited only by how many copies are 
actually made?  What happens if the exporter loses control of the exported software—does 
liability accrue for any additional copies created as well?  Separating the quantity of units 
exported from extraterritorial product creation may create enormous uncertainty in how 
this type of liability is assessed. 




will only expand.  Nevertheless, as previously discussed, protection 
should be construed narrowly to a manufacturing context, as distinguished 
from a design context, to avoid overextending patent protection from its 
traditional limits. 
In addition to the substantive reasons previously discussed, several 
policy concerns support limiting liability under § 271(f).  First, there is a 
general policy concern, reflected throughout the history of patent law, 
against extending protection beyond the boundaries of the United 
States.248  This concern should only increase as international patent 
systems continue to harmonize through global agreements.249  Access to 
patent protection throughout the world is now easier and more readily 
available to all inventors, suggesting that those who wish to extend their 
protection overseas file for patent protection internationally if their 
inventions truly merit global protection.250
A second reason relates to the dramatic increase in global 
manufacturing, particulary in China.251  Since § 271(f) was enacted in 1984, 
the nature of manufacturing has changed dramatically, with much of 
what was once made domestically now being manufactured overseas.252  
Given the cost advantages of manufacturing in countries like China, this 
trend is likely to continue.  Although the stated purpose of § 271(f) was 
to discourage manufacturing outside the United States, the fact that 
international manufacturing has expanded dramatically—and the United 
States has ratified trade agreements such as NAFTA and GATT that 
further facilitate this expansion—suggests less need for broad protection 
under § 271(f).253
 248. See supra notes 32–57 and accompanying text. 
 249. These agreements include the Paris Convention, the Patent Cooperation Treaty 
(PCT), as well as others.  See generally MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 699–743 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing the various international 
protection schemes and how to prosecute patents internationally). 
 250. Id.; see also STOBBS, supra note 29, at 492–519. 
 251. Globalization has resulted in movement of manufacturing to the lowest cost 
location.  These trends have “resulted in growing international trade . . . and more 
distributed manufacturing capabilities.”  SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 24, at 517. 
 252. The United States Bureau of Labor Statistics reports a decline in 
manufacturing jobs from about 17 million jobs prior to 2001 to around 14.5 million in 
2003.  See U.S. Dep’t of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics, NAICS 31–33: 
Manufacturing, at http://www.bls.gov/iag/manufacturing.htm (last modified Dec. 29, 
2004).  At the same time, China’s output of manufactured goods, as well as its imports to 
the United States, have soared.  See N. Gregory Mankiw, China’s Trade and U.S. 
Manufacturing Jobs, http://www.whitehouse.gov/cea/mankiw_testimony_house_ways 
_and_means_oct_30.html (Oct. 30, 2003). 
 253. Recall that the stated purpose of Congress in enacting § 271(f) was to 
discourage foreign manufacturing.  See supra notes 118–23 and accompanying text.  
Because Congress and the President have freely entered into global trade agreements 
such as NAFTA that encourage overseas manufacturing, the underlying policy basis 
behind § 271(f), discouraging extraterritorial manufacturing, may be questionable today. 
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A third reason relates to the trend of outsourcing information 
technology and software jobs.  Over the last several years, companies have 
increasingly turned to exporting these high skill, and high paying, jobs 
overseas.254  Section 271(f)’s role in this trend is indeterminate; however, 
broad application of § 271(f) to activities like software design and 
development—that are not distinctly separated from manufacturing, as 
in other industrial areas—might further encourage employers to export 
software development jobs.  Suppose a company plans to develop a product 
to target a particular country knowing there is no U.S. patent protection 
there.  Does it make sense to develop the software components of that 
product in the United States and risk possible infringement merely for 
emailing the code to the overseas manufacturer when the exact same 
effort can be done in lower cost countries such as India or China with no 
similar implications? 
For these policy reasons, liability under § 271(f) should be construed 
narrowly to provide economic incentives for American companies and 
their domestic employees to compete in an increasingly global marketplace. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
As technical innovations reshape our world, computer hardware and 
its associated software will undoubtedly play an expanding role.  Personal 
computers and their associated desktop and Internet applications will 
likely dominate our perceptions of computer and software technology.  
Behind the scenes, however, embedded software applications will be 
used to replace traditional mechanical and electronic components in a 
growing variety of devices and systems.  In the future, these embedded 
processors will be found in almost every type of product.  Moreover, use 
of Internet and distributed applications, in both desktop and portable 
devices, will expand dramatically as well, blurring the boundaries of 
where and how software is used.  The consequence of these trends is that 
computer software will be present in more and more products, in many 
cases providing a critical role, but often hidden from view.  Inventors 
and their employers will undoubtedly try to protect their efforts in 
developing these innovations through the patent system, particularly 
 254. See, e.g., Stephen Baker et al., Software: Programming Jobs are Heading 
Overseas by the Thousands.  Is There a Way for the U.S. to Stay on Top?, BUS. WK. 
ONLINE, at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/04_09/b3872001_mz001.htm 
(Mar. 1, 2004). 
TIETSWORTH 4/7/2005  1:12 PM 
 
456 
now that earlier limitations on software patentability have been removed.  
At the same time, businesses will increasingly turn to offshore product 
manufacturing to trim costs and capitalize on the increasingly global 
market for products.  This will make it common for software developed 
in the United States to be exported, in a variety of ways, for integration 
into products manufactured overseas, opening the door for potential 
extraterritorial infringement liability under § 271(f). 
The law must be flexible in adapting to these changes by allowing 
protection for nontraditional types of product components such as software.  
It must, however, do this by recognizing the limited manufacturing-related 
purposes behind 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) and narrowly tailor potentially 
infringing components to these situations.  Additional policy concerns 
about the changing role of product design and manufacturing, in light of 
rapid offshore manufacturing and market globalization, suggest that 
domestic innovation might be enhanced by limiting the scope of what is 
a protectable component; perhaps § 271(f) should even be revisited.  Taken 
in concert, these concerns require that software be treated as a 
component for purposes of § 271(f) liability, but that the scope of 
protectability be narrowly limited as proposed in this Comment. 
As the patent system has demonstrated over the last fifty years, it is 
capable of recognizing conceptual distinctions associated with new 
technologies, and ultimately assimilating them without dramatic statutory 
changes.  Software components are no exception.  Software can be 
reconciled with the protections afforded by 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) without 
creating the excessively broad infringement liability suggested by Eolas 
and Imagexpo.  This can be done by imposing liability for software 
component export, but only for those components closely tied to product 
manufacturing.  In addition, liability should only be imposed based on 
the actual quantity of software units exported, not for mere export of 
master units that are replicated abroad. 
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